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Algeria is caught in a stalled political transition. In 1991, the ancien regime,
lacking credibility in a time of crisis, was forced to open the political system to opposition
groups. However, because the regime was unprepared for any substantial transfer of
power, the electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) led to a military coup,
and a civil war pitting radical Islamists against a authoritarian regime.
Algeria's conflict has ramifications that travel far beyond its borders. Europe
states rely upon Algerian natural gas for their energy needs, and are fearful of the impact
of Islamic revivalism on their security situations. The result has been strong European
support for the military regime, leading Algeria's radical Islamists to identify European
states as co-belligerents.
Since neither the Algerian military nor the Islamic radicals have the might to
achieve a military victory, the conflict can only be resolved through a political settlement.
To protect its interests in North Africa, the West must ensure that the settlement offers the
ability to participate to every political faction willing to forswear political violence.
Endorsing the Platform of Rome, and accepting political Islam as a facet of civil society is
the only way to bring peace to Algeria.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1991 Algeria was on the verge of a democratic transition. The state's economic
distress had produced a series of riots that cost the government a great deal of legitimacy. For its
own survival, the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) had little choice but to liberalize the
political system Events culminated in December 1991, when following the installation of a new
constitution, Algeria held the first national multi-party election since its independence from France
in 1962. Unfortunately, the democratic process was stillborn. Democratization was supposed to
be a tool through which the FLN could regain its legitimacy, and the ruling elites had not
envisioned the possibility of any real transfer ofpower. Thus, when the religious-based Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS) overwhelmingly defeated the ruling FLN, the army forced President Chadli
Benjedid to resign, and seized power in a bloodless coup. When Islamic groups protested this
illegal usurpation ofpower the new regime arrested its leaders and granted extraordinary
freedoms to the state's security apparatus under the pretext ofmaintaining order. Islamic-initiated
violence soon emerged, and Algeria's experiment with democracy deteriorated into a bloody civil
war. In the interim five years more than 50,000 people have died in this conflict.
Algeria's stalled transition carries ramifications that go far beyond the state's borders. For
economic and political reasons, European states feel an Islamic Algeria would be a threat to their
security. The Mediterranean states rely upon Algerian natural gas for its energy needs, while the
entire continent fears the influx of refugees they expect to accompany the installation of an Islamic
government. Thus Europe has been a significant factor during the course ofthe war. The
economic and political support provided by key European countries has been instrumental in
helping the military to resist domestic pressure.
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During this period, the military became somewhat dependent upon this assistance. Since
the government lacked electoral legitimacy, it needed the infusion of capital to maintain its hold
on the people in light ofthe strong societal push. The relationship between the Algerian military
and its European sponsors is one of symbiotic dependency. The military needs European support
to survive, while Europe needs the military to stay in control to preserve the economic
arrangement and prevent an exodus of refugees.
By 1995 however, four years of continual conflict had begun to affect the unity of
Algeria's European supporters. Bosnia and the economic development of Eastern Europe were
increasingly more important to the nations ofNorthern and Central Europe. When the FIS
reached a national pact with the secular political opposition, the European coalition was in danger
of collapsing. To persuade the international community to continue to fund its campaign against
the Islamists, the Algeria military would have to establish its right to rule.
Thus in 1995, the military held elections for the Algerian presidency. The victor was
retired General Liamine Zeroual, who had served as the junta's leader since 1993. However,
while international observers declared the election to be fairly administered, it was far from free
and its mandate was suspect. The FIS was banned from participating while its secular coalition
partners refused to validate the legitimization of military rule. Political parties representing more
than 80% ofthe electoral vote in the 1991 election failed to participate. Domestically there is a
strong possibility that the vote was a protest against the deterioration ofAlgeria instead of an
endorsement of military rule. Since the campaign's conclusion, the government has attempted to
use its renewed international legitimacy to force the secular opposition to accept its plan for
political equilibration while suppressing the FIS.
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The government's plan is unlikely to succeed because it seeks to reinstate the old political
system, which makes Europe's decision to support the regime questionable. Islam still has a
strong hold on Algerian society and continued government suppression ofthe politically based
FIS will not alter this arrangement. What it will affect however, is the balance between the
moderate and the radical wing ofthe Islamic movement. Since the FIS is unable to achieve power
through democracy and cooperation, the government's attempt to reinstitute the previous
arrangement between state and society will only lead to increased support for the militant
Islamists like the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
As this thesis demonstrates, the FIS was always a moderate Islamic voice in Algeria, and
its suppression only led to the further radicalization ofthe religious opposition. Europe opposed
the democratic installation of an Islamic regime on its periphery for security reasons. However, as
the commonplace assassination ofEuropean nationals in Algeria, and the summer 1995 Paris
subway bombings demonstrate, this policy has actually increased Europe's security risks.
Europe must balance its long term interests against its short term needs. The only path
that offers a chance for the conflict's resolution is the national pact reached by the FIS and
Algeria's secular opposition in January 1995. The Platform ofRome committed signatories
representing more than 85% percent ofthe electorate to a democratic Algeria. However, its
proponents were unable to persuade the international community to cease support for the military
government. France and its allies refused to approve any plan that offered a role for a political
Islamic regime on its borders. Meanwhile, the United States has been reluctant to interfere in
what it perceives to be Southern Europe's hegemonic sphere. The result ofthe international
community's stance will be the continued deterioration ofAlgerian society, and the strengthening
of the radical Islamic movement. In this lies the irony. Southern Europe backs the military
xni
because it opposes any equilibration that offers a role for political Islam due to the fear ofthe
resultant impact on domestic security. However, denying political Islam the ability to function as
a part of civil society only strengthens the capabilities ofthe radical Islamists like the GIA that can
bring Europe's fears to fruition.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In most countries the state has its army, but in Algeria the army has its state
-Mohammed Harbi *
A. ALGERIA AT THE CROSSROADS
In 1962, following a long and bloody struggle, the young revolutionaries ofthe
National Liberation Front (FLN) won Algeria's independence from France. Promising to
reverse a century ofEuropean domination, the revolutionary leadership struck a bargain
with society in which the populace ceded its right for open political participation in return
for efficacious rule. By the mid 1980s, this social contract was in jeopardy. The socialist
dreams ofthe revolutionary leadership had given way to a bloated and parasitic state.
Thirty years of inept rule had created a large gap between state and civil society. The
general population viewed the FLN as an authoritarian elite that divided the state's spoils
amongst itselfto the detriment of society. Furthermore, sixty percent ofthe populace had
been born after the nation's independence. Thus, the government could no longer rely
upon its wartime mystique as a basis for legitimacy. In the rentier state Algeria had
become, government survival was based solely on the ability to deliver goods and services.
When a worldwide recession hit in the mid 1980's, the international price of gas
and oil dropped precipitously. The shock of this event had long term repercussions for
Algeria. Oil and gas revenues provided the vast majority ofthe state's export revenue.
When prices dropped, the state's elites were unable to maintain the patronage networks
1 Quoted in Robert Mortimer. "Algeria: The clash between Islam. Democracy, and the Military."
Current History. (January 1993)p. 37.
that supported the party. To maintain their position, ruling elites would have to formulate
a new basis for their rule. As Yahia Zoubir notes, "In order to survive, ruling elites
decided to open the political system, making it easier to control the social and political
movements opposed to them than would have been possible through sheer repression."2
This was the motivation behind President Chadli Benjedid's decision to allow open and
democratic elections for the first time in Algeria's history. Ifthe ruling elites could use the
democratic process to regain their legitimacy, then they could successfully withstand
societal demands.
Unfortunately for the government, democratization in Algeria produced
unexpected results. Factionalization within the FLN and unanticipated societal strength
brought the real possibility that control ofthe national government could pass from the
FLN to the newly formed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). This transfer ofpower was too
much for the military to accept. As one ofthe nation's most secular and Franco-phone
institutions, the army would not accept any government that threatened its special place in
Algeria. Islamic rule would have meant its demise. Thus, "the army, which had declared
itselfthe guardian of democracy and modernity. . .moved directly and forcefully into the
political arena, removing Benjedid in January 1992 and worked behind a civilian facade to
restore the presence, authority, and legitimacy ofthe state."3 The President's term would
2 Yahia Zoubir. "The Painful Transition From Authoritarianism in Algeria." Arab Studies
Quarterly. (Vol. 15 no 3 Summer 1993) p. 84.
3 Azzedine Layachi. "Algeria: Reinstating the State or Instating a Civil Society." in William
Zartman, ed Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration ofLegitimate Authority.
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995): 182.
be completed by an army-dominated High State Council (HCE), while the government
attempted to find a way to liberalize the country with no actual transfer ofpower.
Meanwhile, the military tried and imprisoned the FIS's leadership on charges ranging from
inciting riots to high treason 4
With their leadership imprisoned, and their electoral victory denied, it was not long
before the Islamic supporters ofthe FIS responded with violence. When the government
responded in kind, Algeria began to spin out of control. Radical groups aligned with the
cause, but not under the control of either side, quickly emerged. Paramilitary death
squads and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) attacked each other's sponsors, and civilians
alike. In the last four years, more than fifty thousand Algerians have been killed. In the
words ofAzzedine Layachi, "Algeria's authority and legitimacy diminished. . .to the point
where the state was nearing collapse. "^
1. European Concerns
The possibility of state collapse in Algeria had repercussions that spread well
beyond its borders. Since the beginning ofthe modern historical era, Europe and North
Africa have been inexorably linked. From the establishment oftrade routes during the
Middle Ages to the colonial development ofthe 19th century, events in one region had a
strong impact on the other. The growing concerns ofthe modern world make this
relationship even more important. In addition to its oil wealth, Algeria possesses the
4 Alfred Hermida. "Verdicts that please no one." Middle East International. (24 July 1992) p. 12.
5 Layachi : 1 7 1
.
world's fourth largest natural gas reserves. 6 The need is so great, that two trans-
Mediterranean pipelines were built to directly ship the gas from Algeria to the consumer
nations. In addition to its traditional patron, France, Algeria supplies energy to Portugal,
Spain, Italy, and Germany. Significantly, it provides somewhere between fifteen and
twenty percent of Italy's and Spain's energy needs. By the turn ofthe century, Algerian
gas will meet nearly thirty percent of Southern Europe's energy needs.
^
In addition to a possible loss of inexpensive natural gas, European states feel that
state collapse in Algeria would produce a flood ofunwanted and unabsorbable refugees.
This mass ofhumanity would strain European resources, drain its coffers, and provide a
foothold for radical Islam within the secular boundaries of Europe. Southern European
states, led by France, have expended a considerable amount oftime and money propping
up the Algerian military regime. The costs generated by the societal disintegration, or the
emergence of an Islamic state on Europe's periphery were too high not to be involved.
2. The American Perspective
Throughout the conflict, the United States has been content to follow Europe's
lead with regard to Algeria. While a number ofprivate firms have commercial interests,
the United States has no strong economic concerns or treaty obligations to enforce. Thus,
it has been willing to support European policy. When asked, it has agreed to restructure
" United States Department of Energy. "Algeria: General Background." [http://www.
eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Algena.html].
' Warren True. "Trans-Med expansion nears start-up; Maghreb line nears construction." Oil and
Gas Journal. (Jan 17, 1994) p. 51
its share ofAlgeria's foreign debt, or to support additional loans out of loyalty to its
European allies. While it has called on Algeria's military to negotiate a settlement with the
FIS, it has refrained from applying any real pressure.
3. Validity of International Policies
With regard to the Algerian conflict, there is a great deal of question as to whether
the international response is adequate and appropriate. The international community has
consistently professed neutrality, and called for a political resolution to the conflict.
However, key states have been quite willing to follow the French lead in granting military
and economic support to the junta. In light of such hypocrisy, there is little wonder as to
why Islamic militants began to attack European targets.
B. METHODOLOGY
The following six chapters will examine the current Algerian political situation.
They will show how the current stalemate between the military, its Islamic opponents, and
civil society has produced a stalemate that prevents successful equilibration, and discuss
the effects on European security. The thesis will commence with a historical overview of
the nature ofthe relationship between state and society in Algeria. Building upon William
Quandt's theory of revolutionary leadership, Chapter II will explore the flaws in the FLN's
social contract that led to the party's political demise in 1991. The Chapter will
demonstrate how manipulation ofthe delicate balance ofpower amongst the FLN's
political, bureaucratic, and military wings led to the current crisis. Furthermore, this
chapter explains why society embraced the FIS above equally qualified secular parties
when the political system was liberalized. With this accomplished, it will discuss the
motivations for military intervention and the subsequent civil war.
Chapter III will discuss the leadership, motivations, and organizational structure of
the Islamic opposition in Algeria. I will argue that the true nature ofthe FIS has been
misinterpreted in light ofthe military conflict. I intend to show that the FIS was in fact,
the moderate wing of the Islamic movement, and could play an important role in settling
the Algerian crisis in a manner favorable to Western interests. Significantly, the chapter
will show how government suppression of a loyal political movement led to the
radicalization of its followers. In Algeria, the prohibition ofthe FIS produced the armed
groups that threaten stability today. Despite the claims ofthe Algerian government, these
groups have little if any direct linkage to the politically-based FIS. The chapter will
further demonstrate the price to be paid as continued suppression ofthe FIS strengthens
the radical opposition.
With this accomplished, Chapter IV will discuss European fears and motivations
with to regard to Islam and Algerian politics. It will explain why key European trading
partners have been unwavering in their support ofthe military regime and explore the
nature ofthe symbiotic relationship between Algeria and Southern Europe. Algeria's
military government would have been unable to resist the Islamic militants without the
international legitimacy and financial assistance conferred upon it by European states. At
the same time, Europe is extremely reliant upon Algeria for its energy needs, and would
oppose any regime change that threatened its access. The chapter will also discuss the
domestic political concerns raised in Southern Europe as a result ofthe ongoing crisis.
Chapter V looks at civil society's failed attempt at political resolution ofthe
conflict. Although the government rejected the proposal outright, the national conference
of 1995 offered the best hope for political equilibration in Algeria. Under the auspices of
San 'Egidio, a Catholic lay organization, Algeria's major secular political parties set aside
their differences and joined with the FIS in creating a plan for democratization and respect
for individual rights. I will use the political transformation theories of Juan Linz,
Guillermo O'Donnell and others to explain why this framework still offers the best chance
for resolving Algeria's problems.
Chapter VI explores the Algerian military's attempt to equilibrate the political
system in a way that benefits its own institutional needs. It will show how the division of
power amongst the military leadership resulted in vacillating policies during the civil
conflict, and discusses what that means for Algeria's future. I will argue that the current
military-sponsored plan for national reconciliation is likely to fail. The 1995 presidential
elections brought a considerable amount of legitimacy to the regime. However, post-
election behavior indicates that the government believes it can rebuild Algeria's political
system by co-opting secular opposition parties while suppressing the FIS. There is scant
evidence to suggest that this course of action would be successful. Ifthe FIS is not
allowed to participate in Algerian politics, the Islamic movement is likely to fall under the
domination of the armed groups that had laid waste to Algeria over the past four years.
In Chapter VII, the motivations ofthe key political actors will be summarized, and
the thesis will switch toward an exploration of European security costs should Algeria's
government fail. I will argue that Algeria's ability to co-opt civil society is based upon the
financial resources and legitimacy granted by the international community. As such,
further radicalization ofthe Islamic movement is likely to lead to more violent activities in
Europe, and increased targeting ofEuropean interests in Algeria. The chapter will argue
that this can be prevented ifthe international community directs its support toward crvil
society instead oftoward the government. Southern Europe is willing to prop up the
military regime because these states believe the military's demise will produce cataclysmic
short term costs. It behooves objective observers such as the United States to
demonstrate how the San 'Egidio pact will help to defray the results. Ifthe flawed
political equilibration goes forward, the continued decay ofAlgeria will have a tremendous
effect on European security. Europe opposes an Islamic Algeria because ofthe perceived
economic and social costs it would bring. The irony is that supporting Algeria's
government instead of civil society is more likely to bring these fears to fruition.
H. THE ROOTS OF THE SECOND REVOLUTION
A. THE ARMY TAKES POWER
On 1 1 January 1992, Algeria's top military leadership forced President Chadli
Benjedid to resign and seized power in a bloodless coup. Algeria's first experiment with
democracy had not been to their liking. The elections intended to restore the legitimacy of
the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) had instead produced an ovenvhelming upset
by the religious-based Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Since any true regime change would
have drastically altered the military's relationship to the government, democratization was
a threat to be opposed. Its implementation would have threatened the military's
institutional interests.
The army suspended the 1989 constitution in favor of martial law and a military-
dominated. 'High State Council' (HCE). One ofthis body's first decrees was the
reinstatement ofthe dreaded mukhabarat, or state security apparatus which had been
dismantled during the democratic transition. The result was the rapid suppression ofthe
normative channels of societal discontent that had emerged during the latter part of
Benjedid's reign. The media was tightly controlled, and only official government stories
could be printed. Ifindependent newspapers sought to undertake their own investigations,
their employees were subject to government harassment, and the paper could be shut
down. Dissenting political parties were also suppressed. The FIS was banned outright,
and other political parties were subject to military harassment when they failed to comply
with the HCE's demands.
In light of this suppression, the emergence of societal-based violence was
predictable. Within six months of his return from a self-imposed thirty year exile, the
regime's interim president, Mohammed Boudiaf, became the first political casualty ofthe
second Algerian revolution. State officials, foreigners, and the populace at large, have
become all too frequent targets in what threatened to be a second Algerian revolution. In
the interim five years at least 50,000 people have died.
Throughout this period, the military rarely attempted to settle the dispute by
anything other than military means. Secular political parties were accepted only when they
supported military policy, and the Islamic political opposition was treated as ifthey were
criminals. In November 1995, the military stood for Presidential elections in order to
shore up flagging international support. Retired General Liaime Zeroual, who had led the.
military government for the past three years, won with slightly more than 60 percent ofthe
vote. International observers declared the election to be free and fair, and voter turnout
was placed above 70 percent. However, while the announced margin ofvictory was much
more realistic than most states in the Arab world, any claim to an end to the conflict would
be suspect. Despite the presence of international observers, the election was far from free.
The four candidates participating in the election were selected by the military; the FIS was
officially banned, and a number ofmainstream political parties boycotted the entire
procedure. As a result, the vote might have been a signal that society was tired ofthe
conflict instead of an indication of support for government policy.
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The success or failure ofthe military's efforts to impose stability has implications
that go far beyond its borders. The military government survived largely on the basis on
the economic and political support it was provided by European nations. However, while
supporting the military government may have assisted European short term interests, it
almost certainly has hurt their long term interests. The longer the military suppresses the
Islamists, the more tenuous the hold the Islamist political leadership has on the militants.
If the Algerian political system is not stabilized, the result will be more acts ofterrorism
against European targets, and an Islamic government that is truly hostile to Europe.
B. THE NATURE OF STATE AND SOCIETY IN ALGERIA
What can account for the military's behavior? In the three year period (1989-
1992) between the implementation ofthe new constitution and the first round of elections,
Algeria's transition appeared to be a model worthy of emulation. The monolithic state had
placed itself on a fast track toward democracy. It had allowed other parties to form in
opposition to the FLN and had liberalized restrictions on the media and individual rights to
the point where people were allowed to freely express their opinions. Algeria was on the
verge of democratization, and President Chadli Benjedid appeared to be committed to
change.
However, Benjedid' s commitment did not equate to party commitment; there were
serious divisions in the FLN with regard to democracy, and the nature ofthe party's
development prevented Benjedid from acquiring the ability to control internal dissenters.
To understand the impetus for democratization, and the military's ability to resist, it is
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necessary to understand the relationship between state and society in Algeria since
independence.
1. Formation of Party and Government
a. The 1962 Revolution
After eight years ofbloody war, Algeria won its independence from France
in 1962. Building upon the work ofprevious movements, the National Liberation Front
(FLN), had raised the stakes to the point where France, under the leadership of Charles De
Gaulle, was willing to cut its losses and withdraw. However, the new state was not
without problems. The joy of independence was tempered by the monumental task of
rebuilding all that had been destroyed.
Eight years of open combat had left Algeria economically and socially
devastated. Out of a prewar population of 1 5 million, more than 1 million Algerians were
dead, while another 1.8 million were refugees.** Additionally, Algerian independence
meant the departure ofthe colons, which had vehemently resisted independence. In light
of their past behavior, these settlers felt the government would not protect their interests
or property. Thus, within the first year of independence, almost 1 million European
nationals left for France. Any political benefit received from the departure ofthe landlords
was far outweighed by the resultant social and economic costs. The mass migration meant
the loss ofmost ofAlgeria's skilled labor and capital. As John Ruedy writes "Departing
colons methodically and vindictively destroyed libraries, hospitals, government buildings,
° John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development ofa Nation. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1992) p. 190.
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factories, machinery, and whatever else was within their reach that they could not take
with them."9 Algeria was independent, but economically destitute.
With such difficulties ahead, the FLN decided that democracy was a luxury
that Algeria could ill afford. This system was divisive and wasteful while Algeria had
serious problems that needed to be addressed. To the FLN's leadership, competition
wasted time and resources, both ofwhich were it short supply. Instead, Algeria would be
a socialist nation under the aegis of the FLN.
b. Elite Formation Within the FLN
After eight years ofwar however, "the FLN had become a segmented
structure consisting ofnumerous competing and often hostile subgroups. Some semblance
of a common front remained, but only at the price of tacitly recognizing that inter-elite
conflicts could not be resolved until independence was achieved."10 The primary goals
for the majority ofthe combatant commands were modernization and national
independence. Islam was an organizing tool ofthe revolution, but not its focal point. The
main goal was simply an end to French rule. As leading Algerian analyst John Entelis
notes, in this respect, the Algerian conflict was more of a 'war' than a 'social revolution.':
"The battle was fought by men united in hardly anything except the common objective of
9 Ibid, p. 186.
10 William Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968. (Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 1969) p. 126.
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their hatred - the European settlers. The war ofhideous and singularly intimate brutality
served to avenge the trauma of colonialization.''! 1
Following the war, three major groups emerged to compete for party
dominance: the Willaya commands, which had fought the urban guerrilla war; the army of
the frontier, which had staged actions from Morocco and Tunisia; and the provisional
government, which had represented the movement abroad. As William Quandt notes,
matters were further complicated by "... a backlog of distrust and conflict . . . independ-
ence merely brought the opportunity to settle accounts that had lain dormant because of
the overriding goal of maintaining a facade of unity." 12 These three groups and their
institutional distrust would be the driving force in Algerian politics for the next three
decades.
Between the June 1962 Congress and the installation ofthe first
government in September, the three main groups positioned themselves to determine
which would emerge on top. It is interesting to note that at independence, there was
already a gap between the state's elites and the society they represented. The general
populace was more concerned with finding separated family members and rebuilding their
lives than with settling political disputes. The fate ofthe nation rested with the state's
elites.
*
' John Entelis, Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986)
p. 57.
12 Quandt, p. 148.
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At times, the dialogue amongst the three groups became extremely
fractious. However, disputes rarely resulted in bloodshed. There seemed to be a tacit
agreement after eight years ofwar that open hostilities amongst Algerians would lead to
the disintegration of the state before it came into existence. As Quandt writes:
The fact that physical liquidation was rarely used among the top elites
testifies to the widely shared belief that violence of this type would quickly
destroy any semblance of elite integration Henceforth when capital punish-
ments were carried out against prominent political or military leaders . . .
considerable effort was expended to cloak the proceedings with an aura of
legality. Assassination and execution did not become widely used methods
of resolving elite conflicts. **
These minimal rules of political conflict allowed the various elites to agree
to a balanced power sharing. Once the army ofthe frontier was assured a special place as
the 'guardian ofthe revolution,' it agreed to support a government formed by the political
wing ofFLN. This gave politicians the leverage to exploit the disagreements amongst the
various Willaya commanders. With the support ofthe army, the FLN could co-opt key
Willaya commanders instead of dealing with the organization as a whole. However, this
arrangement meant that the resultant political institutions were not formed by any type of
formal political process; the government of President Ben Bella would be dependent upon
the support of a coalition composed of factions that often violently disagreed with sharing
power with each other. The only route to survival and development would be to play off
the emerging elites amongst the Military, the Urban Revolutionaries (Willayas) and the
Politicians (Intellectuals).
13 Ibid, p. 132.
15
Ben Bella survived for only three years before he was deposed in a
bloodless coup by his Minster of Defense, Colonel Houari Boumedienne. In his attempt to
gain autonomy for the political wing of the party, Ben Bella had failed to notice the
changes in the factions that composed the military and the revolutionaries, as well as the
creation of a new set of elites from the state bureaucracy. The triangle ofparty-state-army
remained intact, but the absorption ofthe Willaya combatants into the increasing
professional army meant that the scales between the military and the politicians were
unevenly balanced. Furthermore, the transformation ofthe intellectual wing ofthe military
into the state's bureaucratic apparatus allowed the military to align with this faction
against the government. In effect, Ben Bella had concentrated on balancing groups
competing with each other and failed to account for collusion between factions seeking to
overthrow the politicians. From 1965 onward Algerian politics would be under the strong
influence ofthe military.
2. Motives for State-Societal Discontent 1965-1989
With the 'iron triangle' secure in its position, Boumedienne' s government began to
enact the wide-sweeping social and economic changes that it felt would bring Algeria into
the modem world. The export earnings from the nation's large deposits of gas and oil
would pay for the development ofheavy industries, while collective farming ofthe vast
tracts ofland left fallow by the departed colons would provide sufficient crops for the
nation to feed itself. During this development the government would provide for the
material needs of the population in return for their acquiescence. In effect, "A ruling
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bargain was struck by the leadership with the people at independence under which the
populace gave up its rights to independent political activity in return for the state's
provision of social welfare." 1 '*
Ifthis had been limited to a briefperiod of intense development, the ramifications
would not have been quite as severe. However, the maintenance ofthese policies for
more than 20 years led to the formation of a pseudo-rentier state. With no opportunity to
participate, and no legal forum for political dissent, the population's support for the
government would be dependent upon its ability to redistribute goods and services. When
the state proved unable to deliver on these promises, the absence ofthe democratic
structures made its links to the populace very tenuous.
C. THE END OF THE SINGLE PARTY STATE
This was Boumedienne's political legacy when he died in 1979. Under his reign,
the state had expanded its control on Algeria's economy and the population's personal
freedoms at the price of democratic participation. In effect, he would build coalitions
amongst state elites and buy offthe general populace. As a result of his methods,
Boumedienne's death produced a major political crisis. The personification of rule that
marked his regime threatened the balance ofpower amongst state elites, and as well as the
factional control of the distribution networks and parastatals that garnered societal
support.
14 John Entelis, "State and Society in Transition." State and Society in Algeria, John Entelis and
Philip Naylor, ed. (Boulder. Westview Press, 1992) p. 1.
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After a briefpower struggle the FLN accepted the military's nominee Col. Chadli
Benjedid, the long time commander ofthe Western military district. However, Benjedid's
nomination did not result from the military's admiration of his leadership or organizational
abilities. As Robert Mortimer notes, "Benjedid was expected to be a relatively weak chief
executive unlikely to dominate the power apparatus to the extent Boumedienne had." 15
Thus state and military elites would not have to worry about another Boumedienne
limiting their actions. They could concentrate on maximizing personal gains to the
detriment of society. During the first decade of Benjedid's rule, the gap between state and
society increased.
When the worldwide recession ofthe early 1980's came, Algeria was hit hard.
Algeria had backed its industrial development on the exploitation of its gas and oil
resources; nearly 95% of its export earnings came from this sector. A $1 change in the
price per barrel of oil meant a loss of a $500 million in Algerian export revenue per year
and during this recession, the price would fall by more than $4 per barrel. Oil revenues
fell from $12.5 billion in 1985 to less than $8 billion in 1986. 16 Furthermore, the
emphasis the government placed upon gas and oil development led it to reinvest profits
into ventures that promised additional explorations. As a result, Algeria sorely neglected
vital areas of its economy. In its effort to build heavy industry, the FLN neglected
* 5 Robert Mortimer. "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War." Middle East
Journal (Winter 1996) p. 20.
1" James Phillips. "The Threat of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria." The Heritage Foundation
Background Papers no. 1060. (November 9, 1995) p. 3.
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agriculture. Ben Bella's vaunted plan to collectivize colon lands never came to fruition.
Food crops were neglected so badly that by 1975 Algeria had transformed itselffrom a net
exporter to an importer of foodstuffs. In addition, flawed negotiations had cost the state
its access to the crucial American natural gas market, at a time when it needed a high cash
flow to pay off development loans taken during the 1970's. Instead the government was
forced to sell to the Europeans at a greatly reduced rate. With such a catastrophic loss in
revenue, some type of structural readjustment was necessary. The state could no longer
afford to offer the high subsidies it provided for basic consumer commodities. The
recession meant an end to revenue sharing.
The end of subsidization meant the demise ofthe unwritten contract between the
government and the people. Since the government was unable to provide for the people's.
basic needs, a strong sense of discontent began to develop, especially since per capita
income had already fallen more than 18 percent between 1985 and 1991. l7 The end to
subsidies also served to highlight the vast differences between the elites and the people
that had developed over more than 20 years ofFLN rule. As John Entelis writes:
Algeria's economic polarization was such that only 5 percent of the population
was earning 45 percent of the national income, whereas another 50 percent
was earning less than 22 percent of national income. Members of the party
elite enjoyed privileged access to foreign capital and goods, were ensured
positions at the head of state owned enterprises, and benefited from corrupt
management of state-owned goods and services. The masses suffered from
the increasing reforms and economic austerity in the mid to late 1980s. . The
FLN had lost legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. * 8
17 Ibid, p. 3.
*° John Entelis. "Government in Algeria." Area Handbook - Algeria, Grace Morton, ed.
(Washington: U.S. GPO, 1995) p. 196.
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The FLN's call for loyalty on the basis of its role in the revolution fell upon deaf
ears. By 1988, more than 60 percent ofthe population had been born after Algeria's
independence. Civil society had already begun to resist the intrusive state, but this crisis
pushed their loyalty to the limit. By now the populace was unimpressed by the FLN's
constant reminders of its role in the Algerian revolution. When the non-elite youth ofthe
nation viewed the party, they saw the authoritative military and the bloated bureaucratic
apparatus instead ofthe valiant revolutionaries and they were unimpressed by calls for
shared sacrifice.
1. The 1988 Riots
Events reached a peak in October 1988. Upset at another round ofprice increases,
and having no institutional channels of protest available, the populace of Algiers rioted for
four straight days (October 26-30, 1988). Their targets were largely limited to
government offices, foreign markets limited to elite patrons, and other symbols that
represented FLN privilege. As Robert Mortimer notes, there is no clear evidence that any
coherent social group organized the outburst. * 9 Indeed, while some religious leaders did
attempt to exploit the unrest for personal gain, the majority tried to calm the populace's
fear. To restore order, Benjedid declared a state of siege and call upon the army to
resolve the situation; an action that produced two unforeseen consequences.
19 Robert Mortimer. "Algeria after the Explosion." Current History. (April, 1990) p. 164
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2. The Military Response
In its response, the military treated the riots as a military problem instead of a case
of civil unrest. "Throughout the spree ofviolence, the security forces fired into the
crowds, which remained composed mainly of teenagers, made arbitrary arrests, and
tortured prisoners."2° Unofficial tallies place the death toll at 159 with hundreds more
wounded and more than 3,000 arrested. 21 The cost to the state was equally severe.
Government facilities suffered an estimated $250 million in damage. 22 The most
advanced and economically important sections of Algiers lay in ruins, while the unwritten
contract between the state and the people had been irrevocably canceled by the army's
harsh response.
The actions also served to show the gaps that had developed between the political
apparatus and the armed forces. The military as an institution was extremely upset at
having to solve what it regarded as a crisis created by the ineptness ofthe constitution.
They valued their roles as defenders ofthe revolution, and should the politicians fail to
fulfill their part in the bureaucratic-political-army compact, the military would see to their
replacement. Thus, when Benjedid announced his intent to seek liberalization in early
November, it was not due to a desire to transform the state. The politicians found
20 Ibid, p. 164.
21 Ibid.
22 Phillips, p. 3.
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themselves isolated from society and their own military allies. To ensure political
supremacy, a new social compact had to be created.
D. INTRA-ELITE MANEUVERING
The October 1988 riots showed just how tenuous the link was between state and
society. The factional conflict within the FLN led it to ignore or suppress the general
populace until it was too late. However, crisis is a mix of danger and opportunity. While
societal discontent threatened stability, it also offered a chance for the political wing to
amass power at the expense ofthe party's other factions. Although he publicly accepted
responsibility for the state's brutal reaction, Benjedid attempted to use the riots as a
fulcrum to crush the bureaucrats and control the military.
With his call for responsible government, Benjedid began by dismissing the
underlings whom he could blame for the riots. However, it was soon apparent that these
actions were less of an attempt to place responsibility than they were an attempt to purge
the political opposition. The vast majority ofthese dismissals, including Prime Minister
Mohammed Cerif Messadia, came from the party's bureaucratic wing which was most
opposed to political reform 23 Indeed, although the military was equally responsible for
the state's harsh reactions, it was almost completely untouched by the purge. Although
the army's chief of internal security was fired, very few military leaders were disciplined.
In city after city, the government held the bureaucratic apparatus responsible, while
sparing the military commanders who had actually ordered the atrocities. Benjedid could
23 Ibid, 185.
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not afford to offend the military as an institution. He needed them to augment his voting
bloc to negate the socially weakened but still politically viable bureaucratic faction. Thus
temporarily granting the military a reprieve was a necessary cost in centralizing the state's
authority.
1. Changes in State-Societal Relations
At the same time Benjedid realized that the party would have to rebuild the linkage
between itself and the society it purportedly represented. This would be a two pronged
effort. The first step was an executive order pardoning and releasing all people arrested in
the course ofthe riot. The second was the implementation of a series ofpolitical and
economic reforms. In effect, "The experience of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union was
about to be duplicated in North Africa's largest and most powerful state."24 Perestroika
would be achieved by the breakup and privatization ofthe vast majority ofthe large,
inefficient state owned corporations, and the imposition of strict limitations on the party's
patronage network. Glasnost would come about with the end ofthe Mukhabarat, and the
easement of state control ofthe media.
These reforms also included a small but significant step in the state's political
transformation when Benjedid proposed legislation that increased the president's power
and made the Prime Minister accountable to the national assembly instead ofthe FLN.
Since party membership had been required for all individuals seeking political office since
24 John Entelis. "Preface." State and Society in Algeria, John Entelis and Philip Naylor, ed.
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) p. xi.
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1980, the latter might not have seemed a major change. The assembly would still be
composed solely ofFLN members and the Prime Minister would still be accountable to
the same constituency. As Mortimer writes however, "The proposal shrewdly implied a
shift from party to parliamentary rule that was responsive to the widespread discontent
with the FLN. "25 The FLN may have been the only party, but changing the rules would
enhance Benjedid's position after the elections; the parliament would no longer be subject
to the traditional balance ofpower amongst the three wings of the party, and Benjedid
would therefore be able to undertake additional reforms later.
However, the restructuring ofthe party's power-sharing structure meant the end to
the carefully negotiated balance ofpower amongst its elites; a loss that they were not
willing to accept. Legislation could be imposed, but the party bureaucracy would resist
should changes fail to meet its expectations. Furthermore, the army was co-opted rather
then controlled; when their institutional interests were threatened, the military would be an
unreliable ally. The lack of enthusiastic support from the party factions meant the
transformation lacked a stable political foundation.
2. Changes to Intra- Elite Relations
As the only candidate for the presidency, Benjedid easily won the 1989 presidential
election. Upon its conclusion, he continued his efforts to alter Algeria's political
landscape. Instead ofthe decrepit arrangement amongst the factions ofthe FLN, he
wanted a state led by the technocratic elites whatever their background. This required a
^^ Mortimer, "Algeria after the Explosion." p. 164.
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balanced market economy and a more inclusive political system. The iron triangle of
party-bureaucracy-military which had governed Algeria for almost 30 years would have to
be scrapped. The new arrangement would be the party's technocrats, the military and the
state's emerging commercial interests. The party's bureaucratic wing would be stripped
of its patronage powers and left to wither away.
The desired changes were so significant that they required a complete rewrite of
the 1976 constitution; an action that could only be undertaken while the bureaucracy
remained discredited by their authoritative response to the riots. It was time for the
military to repay Benjedid for sparing them the worst effects ofthe purge. To guarantee
their support prior to the elections, he appointed Kasdi Merbah to replace Mohammed
CerifMessadia as Prime Minister . Merbah had served as the head of military security
under Boumedienne and previously held a number ofpolitical appointments under
Benjedid. He had the full respect ofthe military. As long as Benjedid supported him, the
politicians could count on the army's votes.
cl Reemergence ofMilitary Political Awareness
Co-opting the military as a political partner was a necessary but not
desirable task for the politicians. Having emerged from its ranks following the death of
Boumedienne, Benjedid was only too aware ofthe army's strength - politically, econ-
omically, and militarily. As a functioning wing ofthe FLN it had been instrumental in
shaping the course ofthe country. Its generals held top political offices and as
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demonstrated by the coup against Ben Bella in 1965, the army would seek to protect itself
and the state from what it perceived to be self-serving politicians.
However, the politicians had little choice. Although the populace had
blessed Benjedid, the country's legislation still flowed through the FLN. Without solid
military support, Benjedid would be unable to accomplish anything. Quandt's analysis of
the FLN in 1965 still applied to the party structure in 1989. Much as Ben Bella became
the first president because of disorganized opposition, Benjedid was able to enact his
political reforms because ofthe high levels of factionalism. By co-opting key political
allies and securing military votes, Benjedid could present a unified front to those that
opposed his agenda. His was merely the strongest coalition. There was significant
opposition to the proposals for political transformation, but factionalism and infighting
prevented the party from organizing around an alternate leader. As Mortimer writes:
Many of the same forces that had resisted the rewriting of the national charter
now stood against the drift of Benjedid's proposals for institutional reform . . .
Before the party convention, Prune Minister Merbah had run into a similar road-
block when he presented his government program to the FLN-controlled National
Assembly; a block of deputies withheld approval more than a week . . . Although
it was clear that there was opposition in the local party cells, there was no clear
alternate leadership, especially insofar as Benjedid had been careful to line up the
support of the large bloc of delegates from the military ... the party officially gave
its blessing. 26
26 Ibid, p. 180.
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With such a significant alteration ofthe political balance amongst elites,
there would be consequences. Although the army had always played an important role in
Algerian politics, the end of the iron triangle left it in a position where it would no longer
be controlled by the politicians or the bureaucracy. By isolating the bureaucracy in his
attempt to enact change, Benjedid ensured that the army would be Algeria's power
broker. Whichever faction it chose to support would succeed.
Furthermore, while the military had always returned to barracks after
defending the party and state from political threats, the new arrangement changed their
institutional interests. They were now responsible to the state, not the party. Ifthe
politicians could not maintain stability, then the army would see to it that order reigned.
Military leaders were tired of losing their prestige through internal police activities
resulting from political incapacity.
b. Enactment ofthe New Constitution
Benjedid' s new constitution was approved via national referendum in
February 1989. Significant changes included the end ofthe state's commitment to
socialism, the allowance ofpolitical organizations independent ofthe FLN, and the
strengthening of executive power. Furthermore, with the consolidation ofthe reforms the
politicians felt they no longer needed to placate the military. The new constitution gave the
military no special preferences. It even stripped the army of its title of 'defender ofthe
revolution' which had been conferred upon the institution in 1962 in acknowledgment of
its sacrifices against the French. Additionally, for the first time the military was to be
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placed under the direct control ofthe nation's civilian leadership. "The 1989 constitution
. . . gave Benjedid some freedom from ideological constraints. At the some time, it
opened Algerian politics in dramatic fashion."27 For the first time, the FLN would stand
for election against other political organizations.
3. The Rise of the Islamic Salvation Front
Benjedid's reforms gave Algeria the appearance of a nation on track for
democracy, but it is important to remember that democracy was not the goal, it was
merely a byproduct of his effort to enhance his position vis-a-vis the iron triangle.
Winning electoral victories in a system that provided open political competition could
once again give the FLN a legitimate right to rule. Since the politicians were now in firm
control ofthe party, Benjedid's power would therefore be consolidated. The reality ofthe
situation was that the party expected very little challenge to its rule; society was in a state
of extreme discontent, but social interests were too diverse and factionalized for any one
group to pose a challenge. The state reinforced these divisions by allowing more than 30
different parties to register for the initial stab at democracy: regional and municipal
elections scheduled for 1990. With this many groups the political wing ofthe FLN
thought the protest vote would split in such a way that the new parties would cancel each
other's votes. No matter how flawed the FLN's internal workings, its organizational
capacities were such that it would be guaranteed victory.
27 Ibid, p. 180.
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What they failed to consider however, was the challenge posed by the lumpen civil
society that existed external ofthe state. While civil society was extremely diverse, one
key factor cut across demographic lines to unite a significant percentage ofthe general
populace - religion. Thus, when the FIS petitioned for the right to organize as a political
party, it encountered little opposition. As Benjedid noted at the time:
The activities of the Islamist party are submitted to precise rules. If they
respect them, we cannot forbid them. We are Moslems and it is important
for us to encourage Islam in its just conception, not the pseudo Islam of
myths and extremism. If certain people do not look on this legalization
kindly, that is then affair. For our part, it is not conceivable to apply
democracy to communists and to deprive that which preaches spiritual
belonging . . . Democracy cannot be selective.^
Benjedid' s politicians underestimated the power of religion because they thought
that in a state where 99% ofthe population was Sunni Moslem, an organizational identity
based upon religion would be redundant. Most parties, including the FLN, had Islamic
devotion amongst their tenets. Additionally, the FIS was one of five parties organized
directly around Islam Thus, the government felt religion would offer no special
advantage to one group over another. In fact, the reemergence ofthe religious devotion
that the FIS represented could be used to help pacify the populace. Religion had helped to
end the factional disputes the followed independence and Benjedid might have thought it
could assist him during this transition period.
2% Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa. (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1993) p. 74.
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In this, Benjedid's reformers committed their gravest error. Religion was a
unifying factor in Algeria, but it benefited society, not the state. Indeed, during the FLN's
thirty year reign, state control ofthe media and the omnipresent secret police ensured that
the mosques were the only channel of dissent. A clear example was the state's attempt to
ensure the loyalty ofthe religious establishment to the state. In the early 1970's, the FLN
declared that only Imams who had received the approval of the Ministry of Religious
Affairs were to lead prayers. Society simply ignored the edict. People flocked to the
equivalent of storefront churches where they could pray what they wanted instead ofbeing
limited to government approved clerics and texts. As the nation underwent massive
urbanization during the 1970's and 1980's, the state found itselfunable to furnish
sufficient state-approved Imams. As a result, "The 'Imam shortage' opened the way for
the independent Islamist movement which quickly moved in to fill the public arena. These
unofficial Imans preached wherever they could find space and occupied official mosques in
defiance ofgovernment legislation."29 As a result, Islam was a unifying factor amongst
the opposition long before the 1988 riots. Much as Catholicism served help to unite
Solidarity in Poland, Islam unified the opposition in Algeria.
With its diverse base of support, the FIS quickly emerged as the FLN's main
opposition. It officially registered as a political party in September 1989, and quickly
captured the support ofthose upset with the FLN's autocratic rule. Its strength was first
demonstrated in the nation's first pluralistic election, held in March 1990. The election
29 John Entelis. "Government in Algeria." Area Handbook - Algeria, Grace Morton, ed p. 208.
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covered regional and city governments. Competing against more than 12 other parties,
the FIS won control of a majority ofthe Willaya governorships, and the city councils in
the major cities ofAlgiers and Oran, as well as a number of smaller towns. Although the
FLN still controlled the national government, it was apparent that Benjedid's plan had
failed.
4. Demise of the FLN
The FIS's victory in the 1990 elections spelled the beginning ofthe end for the
FLN. The party had bought off on Benjedid's political reform because it would enhance
FLN's ability to rule. It had given little thought to the possibility that political competition
would put it in danger of actually losing power. Ifthe politicians could not find a way to
maintain the party's hegemony, the differences in opinion over whether to democratize,
.
and the methods employed by Benjedid's reformers would split the party.
Thus with little more than eighteen months before the democratic experiment was
applied at the national level, the FLN began to alter the political landscape to suit its
needs. Claiming that certain areas had previously been underrepresented, the politicians
proposed to increase the number of seats in the national assembly from 295 to 542.30 ^he
vast majority ofincreases would be located in the rural areas where the FLN felt it was
stronger than the FIS. A second change was the implementation ofthe French-based two
round voting system Ifno candidate received an absolute majority in the first round, then
30 Robert Mortimer. "Algeria: The Clash between Islam, Democracy, and the Military." Current
History (January 1993) p. 39.
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the top two candidates would compete against each other in a follow-on vote. The FLN
presumed that in the national elections, when faced with a choice between the Islamists
and themselves, such changes would force the populace to vote for the FLN instead of
their preferred party. Thus, the FLN would be able to maintain its hold on power while
gaining the legitimacy ofthe electoral process. These beliefs were supported by a
government study in May 1991 that predicted that the FLN would have a majority in the
assembly even if it received fewer popular votes that the FIS. The survey showed that
with a predicted national vote of only 24 percent, the FLN would hold 244 seats while the
FIS with a projected 33 percent would receive only 206 seats.-**
However, the study was premature, and its methodology was flawed. It did not
anticipate a strong societal reaction to these 'reforms' or a weakening ofthe coalitions
that bound the FLN. Yet within the year both occurred. The general populace no longer
blindly accepted the FLN's decrees, and resulting backlash damaged the party as its
various factions sought to shift blame onto each other in their attempts to protect
institutional interests.
a. Societal Withdrawal From the FLN
When the FLN instituted these 'reforms' in 1990, it encountered a much
more independent and skeptical society. Furthermore, the state's previous political and
social liberalization gave the populace channels to protest what they viewed as a clearly
unjust use ofthe political system to benefit the FLN. Newspapers and the electronic
31 Ibid, p .39.
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media openly criticized the government's blatant abuse ofpower, and gave wide coverage
to opposition leaders protesting the changes. Additionally, while the measure was
designed to hinder the Islamists, the restrictions they placed upon secular parties made for
a broad coalition aligned against the state. Movements as diverse as the Socialist Forces
Front (FFS), and the Movement for a Democratic Algeria (MDA) joined the FIS in
condemning the changes, and calling for a return to the electoral process agreed to in the
1990 constitution.
When political protests failed to yield tangible results, the leadership ofthe
FIS decided that a demonstration ofAlgeria's new balance ofpower was in order. While
the FLN still held the national posts, the FIS had built much stronger societal ties through
the unexciting but extremely important administrative positions won in the 1990 elections..
Six months before the elections, the FIS encouraged the populace to once again return to
the streets in protest by calling for a general strike to protest the FLN's actions in May
1991.
While it had been slow to respond to the 1988 riots, the national
government did not hesitate to quickly intervene this time. Within hours ofthe first
demonstration in Algiers, Benjedid declared martial law and called upon the army to break
up the assemblies. The army responded with violence similar to that employed in 1988,
killing dozens and arresting thousands. Amongst the latter' s numbers were the FIS' top
political leaders including Chairman Abassi Madani and Vice Chairman Ah Benhadj.
Since the state was under martial law, the government was able to bypass the judicial
33
system, and quickly tried the men before a military tribunal. Despite their claim that they
had a valid permit from the FIS controlled city council, the military declared the Algiers
demonstration to be illegal and sentenced Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, the party's top
leaders, to 12 years in prison for inciting a riot.
b. Loss ofMilitary Support
On the political front, while Benjedid had publicly accepted responsibility
for the 1988 riots, this time he sought to place the blame squarely upon the backs ofthe
party apparatus and the military. With regard to his security, this was not a wise move,
because it enhanced the growing split between Benjedid' s political wing and its military
allies. The military leadership was already upset with Benjedid by the dismissal of their
patron Kasdah Merbah, after a mere six months as Prime Minister. They demanded the
resignation ofMerbah's successor, Mouland Hamrouche, one of Benjedid's key allies
from the party's political wing. For his replacement, the military 'recommended' Sid
Ghozali, a former military officer who had held a number of significant posts under
Boumedienne during the 1970's.
Furthermore, while the military had accepted some institutional culpability
for the 1988 riots, it held the politicians responsible for these demonstrations. By the
time ofthe May 1991 protests, the FLN's central committee no longer included any
military officers. 32 in fact, following Merbah's replacement as Prime Minster, the
32 Ibid, p. 42
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military's top leadership began to resign from the party. The preservation ofthe army as
an institution was more important than the preservation ofthe party. Thus, when the army
was called out for the second time in three years to suppress civil unrest on the behalf of
the state, there was a great deal ofresentment at the loss of institutional integrity that it
suffered due to the failures of corrupt politicians. The riots were the final straw for the
military; Benjedid's politicians would have to succeed or fail by themselves. His coalition
dissolved, and the military could no longer be considered a reliable ally.
E. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE STATE
In light of societal unrest, the government postponed the elections, originally
scheduled for June 1991, until December. With the nation under a state of siege,
campaigning was muted. Indeed, political parties were not allowed to publish their
pamphlets for the first three months ofthe campaign. Furthermore, the government felt
that the arrest and conviction ofMadani and Benhadj would lead to the disintegration of
the FIS. The government almost received its wish. Racked by internal divisions, the FIS
only decided to participate in the election twelve days before the December 26 vote. 33 In
light ofthe FIS' perceived weakness, the government saw no reason to force the
government to delay elections again.
The results surprised both sides. In the first round the FIS won 188 seats outright,
while the FLN won a mere 16 seats, and in fact placed an ignominious third behind the
33 Yahia Zoubir. "The Painful Transition from Authoritarianism in Algeria." Arab Studies
Quarterly. (Summer 1993) p. 101.
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FFS which garnered 25 seats. If the FIS won 28 seats in the second round of elections
scheduled for early January, they would be able to rule outright. Since the FIS had a
candidate in nearly every run-off, its parliamentary majority appeared to be a foregone
conclusion.
1. The Military as Power-Broker
Benjedid's restructuring ofthe FLN's power structure now worked against his
interests. He had destroyed the bureaucratic wing ofthe party, while the military had
resigned from the party, and was proving to be an unwilling and untrustworthy ally. Since
the FLN's technocratic faction had performed so miserably in the national elections,
Benjedid would have to accommodate the Islamists to remain in power. As Yahia Zoubir
writes, it was this action that led to the military's seizure ofpower. "Benjedid's behind-
the-scenes dealings with the FIS prompted the military to cancel the electoral process just
five days before the second ballot. The military could no longer endure the maneuvering
ofBenjedid, the FIS and some factions ofthe FLN."34 Political accommodation ofthe
Islamists posed a direct threat to the military. They felt the technocrats were trying to
make a deal that benefited their desires instead ofAlgeria's needs. The result would be a
reduction in the military's political autonomy and political capacity. Ifthe generals
waited to see how the Islamists might govern, the military might be weakened to the point
where it would not be able to maintain order when the government failed again.
34 Ibid, p. 103.
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On January 1 1, 1992 the military forced Benjedid to dissolve the national
assembly, and then resign his position. The result ofthese maneuvers was the negation of
any lawful succession under constitutional law; the speaker ofthe assembly could not fill
Benjedid' s position, because the dissolution ofthe assembly meant the termination ofthe
office. In the place of constitutional rule, the military instituted a five member High
Security Council (HCE). Although the military as an institution would play a major role in
the policies formulated by this group, it preferred to operate behind the scenes where its
institutional autonomy and integrity were less likely to be questioned. As a result, one of
the military's first acts was to invite Mohammed Boudiafback from his self-imposed exile
to lead the government. Boudiafhad been one of the nine original members ofthe FLN,
but had broken with the party during the first year ofindependence for a twenty-six year
selfimposed exile in Morocco. The military felt his background and integrity would give
their policies a great deal of social legitimacy, helping them to win the hearts and minds of
those sectors ofthe population that had been ambivalent toward an Islamist government.
However, while Boudiafhad certainly sacrificed for his beliefs, his selection did not
necessary mean a continuation of Algeria's political transformation. Instead:
[Boudiaf s] itinerary was at once his strength and weakness, for despite his
reputation for political integrity, his long absence left him without a powerbase
in Algeria. He gambled that he could steer the country between the dual shoals
of the old FLN order and the new Islamism while averting a complete takeover
by the army. He believed he could rally a 'silent majority' behind his own
conception of a grand patriotic secular party.
3' Mortimer. "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War." p. 26.
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Boudiaf s actions served to demonstrate that he would not be a front man for the
rnilitary's policies. He did not support the army's authoritarian plan any more than he had
Ben Bella's agenda in the 1960s. Instead he called for, "The termination ofprerogatives
enjoyed by the FLN in order to weaken the attraction ofthe FIS whose political program
was focused on the privileges accumulated by the FLN regime. "^^
2. Militarization of the Regime
Boudiaf s refusal to comply with the army's draconian crackdown made him a
liability instead of an asset. He may have criticized the Islamists use ofthe mosques for
political purposes, but his refusal to ban them from the political process was unacceptable.
Additionally, he demanded that the military undertake a number of confidence-building
efforts to reassure the populace of the government's intentions. For starters, he felt the
government should close the detention camps where Islamists had been detained without
trial since the coup, and the FIS's political leadership should be released to participate in a
dialogue ofnational reconciliation amongst the nation's political parties.
Less than six months after he returned, Boudiafwas assassinated by a member of
his security detail. Despite the fact that these individuals were selected from amongst the
army's best officers, a subsequent military investigation blamed 'radical Islamists' for his
death. However, with regard to domestic political opinion, the military's investigation
raised more questions than answers, suggesting that the army was the source ofBoudiaf s
36 Zoubir, p. 104.
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end. 37 Subsequent to his death, the military declared that the country's deteriorating
security situation necessitated a two year state of emergency. IfBoudiaf could not help
the military when he was alive, perhaps his corpse could do better.
3. The Rise of Political Violence
With the military-backed government intent upon suppression instead of
reconciliation, it was not long before the political impasse led to a military struggle. With
Boudiaf dead, there was no place for moderates within the government. Meanwhile, the
abrogation ofthe elections severely discredited the Islamic movement's politicians. The
cleavage between the two groups threatened to tear the state apart. Rapid social decay
means the disintegration ofthe trust that binds a society together. The previously united
civil society began to fragment along associational lines. Dissident groups not only
distrusted each other as much as they distrusted the military and the Islamists. In such an
environment, political compromise would be extremely difficult.
With regard to the Islamists, military suppression severely hindered its ability to
function as a front. Previously, it had maintained the coalition by providing a balanced
leadership; Madani represented the moderates while Benhadj spoke for the radicals. With
both leaders held incommmiicado by the military, there was little that could be done to
prevent it from fragmenting. The moderates wanted to use the legitimacy oftheir
electoral victory to persuade the international community to bring pressure on the military
regime to reach a settlement with the FIS. Meanwhile the radical wing, which had
3
' Mortimer. "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War." p. 27.
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opposed submitting Islam to the electoral process in the first place, declared Jihad and
began to attack government facilities in the same way their fathers and grandfathers had
30 years earlier.
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ffl. POLITICAL ISLAM IN ALGERIA
The West has been hesitant to support the FIS's claim to power due to fear
ofwhat an Islamic Algeria would mean for regional stability and European security
needs. Are these fears based upon the specific agenda put forth by the FIS, or a
general misunderstanding ofpolitical Islam? This chapter will show the differences
amongst Islamic groups in Algeria, and demonstrate that the FIS was the moderate wing
of Islamic resistance. The suppression ofthis political movement was responsible for the
emergence ofthe radicals and the start ofthe ongoing civil conflict.
Since the Iranian revolution, the international community has had a difficult
time accepting any Islamic-based political movement. In general, no matter how
corrupt the regime, the West has been willing to back secular authoritarianism over
religious plurality. There is a widely held perception that Islamic revivalism is
counter to Western interests and culture, and thus a threat to be opposed. As John
Esposito, the director of Georgetown University's Center for Christian-Islamic
Understanding, notes:
The easy path is to view Islam and Islamic revivalism as a threat - to posit
a global Pan-Islamic threat, monolithic in nature, a historic enemy whose
faith and agenda are diametrically opposed to the West. . . Just as simply
perceiving the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through the prism of the
'evil empire' had its costs, so too the tendency of American adminstrations
and the media to equate Islam and Islamic activism with Qaddafi/Khomeni
and thus with radicalism, terrorism, and anti-Americanism had seriously
hampered our understanding and conditioned our responses. >%
3% John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth and Reality (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992) p. 169.
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Judging all of Islam by the actions of a few select groups would be the equivalent of
judging American culture on the basis ofthe Unabomber and the Freemen. The world-
wide Islamic revival is not monolithic, and in many cases is quite compatible with Western
interests. In fact, As John Entelis notes, "Most Islamic movements have moved toward a
more popular, pluralistic political stance, champion democratization, human rights and
economic reform. . . .To varying degrees . . .all have emphasized change not through
force. . .but through the political and social transformation of society."3 ^
In Algeria's case, the Algerian military and their French allies have been very
effective at portraying the Islamic insurgency as the second coming ofthe Iranian
revolution. By doing so, they hope to prevent the movement from receiving any
significant political support from the West. This is a good tactical move, but prior to the
military coup there were few indications that Algeria's Islamists had a radical agenda that
threatened the West. Islamic revivalism in Algeria offered little danger of a second Iran.
There is a world of difference between the Sunni nationalism found in Algeria and the
Shiite revolution found in Iran. Accepting the Algerian military's viewpoint prima facie
not only does a disservice to the Islamic movement in Algeria, it produces faulty policy in
the West. The reality is that there are a number of significant differences between the
various Islamic revivals underway today. The FIS never sought to recreate Iran.
3" John Entelis, "Congressional Testimony." in United States Congress, Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Africa: Recent Developments in North Africa, September 28, 1994
(Washington: U.S. GPO, 1995) p. 17.
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Understanding what the movement was, and what power it retains today is crucial in
determining what role it could play in Algeria's future.
A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
While the FIS was not completely inclusive, it is important to remember that it was
a front, instead of a pure political party. Under the general organizational banner of Islam,
it was able to assimilate a number of extremely diverse interests. Members included radical
militants, educated elites, and Algeria's emerging commercial class. At all times the FIS
was many things to many people. As a result, it was easy for Western analysts to point to
the rhetoric ofthe radical elements and claim that the movement posed a direct threat to
Western interests. However, while the FIS could not control the behavior of every faction
claiming membership, closer examination reveals that there was a solid consensus on key
issues amongst those in the political center. Furthermore, the odds were that this group of
Western educated moderates would have been able to control the party's actions.
1. Leadership
While analysts quote religious extremists to hype the threat, the reality is that
Algeria's democratic transition had more in common with the third wave transitions of
Eastern Europe than with the violent revolution of Iran.40 While Iran's turmoil resulted
from a religious-based backlash against rapid modernization, the Algerian crisis was
prompted by an advanced civil society's withdrawal of support for an authoritarian state.
40 For a good example of analysts generalizing about Islamic revivalism on the basis of selected
quotes see Edward Shirley, "Is Iran's present Algeria's future?", Foreign Affairs (Spring 1995)
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Further-more, while Iran's transition took the form of a violent revolution, the Islamic
movement in Algeria initially sought inclusion, and attempted to change state behavior
through the political system Islam was the basis for the movement's identity, but the FIS
had no intention of imitating the authoritarian regime ofthe Ayatollahs. As a Middle East
International article noted in 1992, "While the top leadership ofthe FIS may be in the
hands of individuals bearing the titles 'Sheik' and 'Imam' . . . the group is not run by an
organized clerical hierarchy, abominated by Sunni Islam. "41
Furthermore, while the Iranian revolution was led by the Mullahs, the leadership of
the FIS was drawn from amongst the states technocratic elites. As Esposito writes, "[the
FIS] has gained particular support among recent university graduates and young
professionals . . .contrary to popular assumptions their strength is not so much in the
religious faculties and the humanities as in science, engineering, education, law and
medicine."4^ In fact, 76% ofthe front's candidates for the 1990 municipal elections and
the 1991 parliamentary elections held postgraduate degrees.43 The party's nominal
leader, Abassi Madani holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University ofLondon and his
titular second in command, Ah Benhadi was a high school teacher. Rebah Kebir, who
heads the movement's activities abroad section was a professor ofPhysics at the
University of Algiers. By any account, while the movement's rank and file may have been
41
"The Impact of the FIS Success", Middle East International, (January 10, 1992) p. 8.
42 John Esposito, "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace", Current History, (January 1994)
p. 21.
4-> Esposito, "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace", p. 21
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culled from the uneducated and dispossessed youths of Algeria, the same cannot be said
for its leaders. The individuals atop the FIS could have flourished quite well within the
existing Algerian power structure had they not been bound by their convictions.
2. Political Culture
Since the front's leadership emerged from Algeria's educated elites, they
understood the importance of developing a broad base ofpolitical support. This aspect of
the FIS is often overlooked by Western analysts. Robert Mortimer summarizes such
views well when he claims that, "observers likened the Islamist movement to a nebula
because of its diffuse and indistinct nature, the vagueness of its programs, and the diversity
of its attitudes . . .the FIS cultivated ambiguity as to its concrete policy intentions,
exploiting its irreproachable image as a party of God."44 Following this line ofreasoning,
the FIS was able to hoodwink the populace and capture the protest vote directed against
the FLN, thus winning the elections.
However, while the FIS, like all political movements, undoubtedly benefited from
an ambiguous political platform this reasoning does not explain why the FIS received the
largest share ofthe popular vote. At its creation in 1990, the FIS was one ofmore than
30 political movements, five ofwhich were Islamic in nature. Thus, the FIS could not
even lay sole claim to the mantle ofIslam Furthermore, while it was able to build a
coalition of several divergent groups, the movement was not organized around
personalities. The FIS did not have a charismatic nationally known figure like former
44 Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algeria War", p. 23.
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president Ben Bella, the leader ofthe rival Movement for Democracy in Algeria (MDA).
As a result, other conditions must have contributed to the movement's overwhelming
electoral victory.
In fact, the success ofthe FIS can be attributed to two interrelated factors; its
organizational capacities and its vision for Algeria. These determinants convinced a
majority ofthe populace not only that the FIS would implement the policies they
proposed, but that these tenets would benefit them personally. The clearest proof of this
is the party's victory in the first round ofthe 1991 parliamentary elections. It is important
to remember that this was in fact the second democratic election in Algeria. The
municipal elections of 1990 provided the first opportunity for the public to express its
discontent through the ballot box. In that contest, "The FIS captured two large blocs of
voters; those genuinely attracted to the Islamist message and those who were tired ofthe
old order represented by the FLN."45 When the 1991 elections were concluded, Western
analysts pointed to the loss ofmore than 1 million votes as a sign that the populace was
disenchanted with the movement. In reality however, this drop represents the loss ofthe
second bloc ofvoters; those who had voted for the FIS only as a protest against the
FLN's 28 year rule. Considering the proliferation and increased organizational capacities
of other political movements, the FIS victory was a clear sign that it retained a popular
mandate. Furthermore, although its members had been in office for a little more than a
4-> Mortimer, "Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria", p. 584.
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year, the FIS's victory in the 1990 election allowed it to run upon an established legislative
record. The populace knew how it intended to govern, and supported its campaign.
a. Political Agenda
The FIS's main goal was the implementation of Sharia, and the return of
the state to a strictly Islamic society. In such an arrangement, there would no longer be
any difference between church and state. Islam was an all embracing creed ofbehavior.
As noted Arabist Philip Hitti observed:
The prescriptions of . . . Sharia . . regulate for the Moslem his entire life in
its religious, political and social aspects. They govern his marital and civil
relations as well as his relations with non-Moslems. Accordingly ethical
conduct derives its sanctions and inhibitions from the scared law.4"
More than anything, it is the threat of Sharia that raised fears in the West. Analysts
envisioned an authoritarian regime operating along the lines of Iran and the Sudan. The
result would be crisis after crisis, weakening Algeria's Maghreb neighbors, and prompting
a massive flood ofrefugees into Europe. However, these fears resulted from too shallow
of an examination ofwhat Sharia actually entailed. The West was quick to pick up upon
Ali Benhadj's claim that the vote was, C4not a victory of democracy, but a victory for
Islam."47 Conciliatory statements by leaders such as Abassi Madani made little difference.
Fear of another Iran, this time directly on Europe's periphery made it unlikely that the
West would accept any regime that staked its legitimacy upon Sharia.
46 Phillip Hitti, History of the Arabs, 10th Ed, (London: Macmillian Press, 1970) p. 400.
47 Zoubir: 96.
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However, the simple fact is that prior to the coup, Madam' s centrist faction
was clearly in control ofthe movement. The announced goal of these moderates was a
gradual implementation of Sharia, commitment to democracy, and tolerance for divergent
political views. This was possible because of their interpretation of Sharia's requirement
that government rulers periodically consult the people as a basis for the continuation of
democratic elections. As Faisal Kutty, a writer for the pro-Islamic magazine The
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs noted, "Islamic law has been created through
interpretation, and hence the legal rules, as opposed to the underlying principals, can be
reformulated to meet contemporary situations."48 Thus, the Islamists could claim that
under the right social conditions the Sharia would be able to function as an instrument of
law.
Furthermore, in concentrating on those aspects of Sharia antithetical to
Western mores, analysts missed the bigger picture with regard to Sharia in Algeria. There
is no question that certain groups such as Francophone elites and educated women would
have suffered disproportionate losses in status and privilege when Sharia was
implemented. However, the general population did not back the FIS merely to force
women to wear the chador and close discos. The FIS garnered popular support because
ofwhat the Sharia declared that the state owed society in return for their compliance and
religious fealty. For decades, party elites had amassed great fortunes at the expense ofthe
48 Faisal Kutty, "Islam and the West: Coexistence or Confrontation", The Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs, (January 1996) p. 34.
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common people. After decades of socialist mismanagement, the populace was looking an
alternative that could improve the government's attentiveness to their needs. As
interpreted by the mainstream FIS, the populace believed that Sharia could form the basis
for this social contract. As Mortimer writes:
When an earthquake struck the region west of Algiers in November 1989,
the FIS was the first group to bring aid to the victims, well before govern-
ment supplies arrived on the scene. Beyond this impressive operation, the
party set up a network of medical clinics and other services in the poorest
neighborhoods of Algeria's crowded cities. . . By its social welfare and
relief activities, and its control of the free mosques, the FIS positioned itself
to compete well in elections.49
Some might sum these actions as pandering; interpreting it as an effort to
'buy' the votes ofthe disenfranchised urban masses. However, the simple fact is that the
FIS delivered services that the government was unwilling or unable to provide to its
people. It thus demonstrated that a return to strict construction ofthe Sharia would mean
a government that would be responsive to the population's needs.
Indications ofhow the FIS would govern Algeria are best demonstrated by
its behavior during its briefperiod of control at the local and state level following the 1990
elections. The militants raised societal fears by immediately focused on restructuring
society. As Mortimer noted, "some newly elected town councils closed movie theaters
and coeducational schools . . . Zealots harassed women in Western dress in the streets."50
49 Mortimer, "Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria", p. 579.
50 Ibid, p. 586.
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Enforcement ofthese measures varied widely from city to city, depending on local
official's interpretation of Sharia. However, it is important to not that whatever the
interpretation, within that jurisdiction, the law was applied equally to all. The special
status given to FLN party members was no longer recognized. As a result, "From the
perspective ofthe urban poor, the FIS is credited for providing order and efficiency
through a system of social discipline, equal justice for all and swift punishment. Such
measures were appreciated by those living in fear of street toughs, petty criminals and
troublemakers.
"5 1
Furthermore, with the exception ofthe secular elites who had the most to
lose, the populace was more concerned with the party's efforts to improve the efficacy of
government service. An excellent example are the actions ofthe city council of Algiers.
Garbage had piled up for weeks due to a wage dispute between the FLN run city
government and the sanitation union. When the FIS took power, they mobilized their
supporters to clean the city. Such actions may have been outside the scope ofnormal
governance, but with the all-embracing requirements of Sharia, it was proper for leaders to
call upon the people to assist in solving a problem
In addition to building support amongst the general populace, the FIS
received critical support from Algeria's emerging business interests. Wherever they had
control over the economy, the FIS sought to increase economic liberalization. When
Algeria was ruled by the FLN, the state's socialist nature meant the concentration of
51 United States Congress, p. 26.
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wealth and industry in the state-owned corporations. While state elites benefited
tremendously from such arrangements, they were extremely inefficient. To force the
populace to accept centralized planning, the state taxed independent commercial interests
at an exorbitant rate. This led merchants to cut back or funnel their products into the
parallel economy.
However, the Islamists were great believers in a free market economy.
In the districts they controlled, the FIS encouraged small business owners to reestablish
the traditional souks, or markets, which had been suppressed by the FLN to facilitate
dependence upon their own centralized distribution network. Business owners and the
urban poor welcomed an alternative to the national government's patrimonial networks,
which led to their strong show of support in the 1991 national elections. By focusing on
social restrictions, the west lost sight ofthe economic liberalization and increased efficacy
that resulted from Islamic rule.
b. Support Base
However strong the support, the diversity ofthe movement posed
problems for the FIS. Since it functioned as a front, it incorporated a wide diversity in
interpretations of Sharia, and plans for implementation. As Kutty admits, "The movement
is composed of divergent groups . . . There are significant differences among adherents
over their visions of an Islamic state and the routes to achieve it."52 Madani's group of
moderates may have been dominant at the time ofthe municipal elections, but there was
52 Kutty, p. 34.
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no guarantee that it would stay in charge, or remain conducive to western interests. This
is especially true when the group's reaction to the GulfWar is considered.
The FIS initially condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It felt that the
invasion was unwarranted, and since they had previously received a modest stipend from
Saudi Arabia, the action threatened their interests. However, when the international
community began to put troops in Saudi Arabia, their attitude changed abruptly. Benjedid
called for the deployment ofthe Algerian military to help defend Islam from the West,
while Madani flew to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein in a sign ofArab loyalty. In
such an environment, Europe's growing uneasiness about Algeria under the rule ofthe FIS
is quite understandable.
However, the Islamist's behavior during the GulfWar must be viewed in
the context ofAlgeria's domestic political situation. While it is true that an engagement
between a Western-dominated coalition and an Arab nation undoubtedly inflamed the
masses, the leadership ofthe FIS was using the crisis as an opportunity to gain power vis-
a-vis the government and the army. The FIS called upon the government to train a popular
militia, and deploy the army to help defend Iraq; actions that it knew the government
would be unwilling to accomplish. In fact, the FIS was using the GulfWar as an
opportunity to showcase the weakness ofboth institutions to the general populace. The
GulfWar was a case where a fellow Arab state was under attack by the West, and yet the
government did nothing. Thus, government inaction provided an opportunity for
opposition parties to score points with the general populace. The FIS's rhetoric was
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meant to hoist the army on its own petard. "The FIS. . .accused the Algerian military of
having failed to fight on the side of Iraq and questioned its ability to defend the
country."53 Since the army drew its institutional legitimacy from its role in the defense of
Algeria from Western domination, the army's unwillingness to help a fellow Arab state
must mean that it no longer fulfilled its mandate, and was therefore illegitimate, and not to
be respected.
Furthermore, the FIS's anti-Western stance was not exceptional in the
country at that time. Almost every major party condemned an American and European
presence in the Gulf. Benjedid undertook a round of shuttle diplomacy to states including
France, Jordan, and Egypt before declaring that he could not create a consensus for a
diplomatic solution, while condemning Western interference. Furthermore, Madani was
not alone in visiting Iraq. A slew ofAlgerian politicians including former president Ben
Bella visited Baghdad in a show of 'Arab solidarity.' Viewed in the context of such
actions, the FIS' behavior was not that radical. Instead of expressing an oveivvhelming
hatred for the West, the FIS attempted to exploit a foreign crisis for domestic political
gain. Unfortunately, it also garnered more enmity from the army.
B. CENTER VS. PERIPHERY
1. Fundamentalists vs. Neofundamentalists
While all evidence pointed toward an Algeria led by the moderates, an Islamic
victory would have meant some divisiveness within the FIS. Fundamentalists like Madani
53 Zoubir, p. 98.
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wanted the nation to return to an Islamic way of life. They embraced a traditional
interpretation of Sharia, and promised tolerance toward civil society. In governing
Algeria however, they would have had to contend with neofundamentalists that were
suspicious ofthe West, opposed to education and rights for women, and felt that
modernization was wrong. Like the post-independence FLN, an Islamic victory would
have meant intraparty competition, and the emergence of governing coalitions.
2. Islamic Interaction with Civil Society
In this competition, it was most likely that the moderates would have emerged
dominant. This faction comprised the movement's educated elites and they possessed the
organizational capability to outlast whatever fragmented opposition emerged from the
ranks ofthe neofundamentalists. The moderates would have won for the same reason Ben
Bella had won Algeria's first presidency; the weakness ofthe political opposition. The
strength ofthe moderate's coalition is important, because it outlines how the FIS would
have interacted with civil society.
In fact, strong ties between the FIS, the secular political movements, and civil
society at large was an extremely important goal for Madani. The French had predicted
that Islamic rule would result in hundreds ofthousands of refugees; most from the state's
educated elites. Madani sought to prevent this by repeatedly assuring this group that it
would not be unduly singled out for punishment. The target of Islamic rage was the
corrupt socialist government, not society at large. He realized that his program of social
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transformation was dependent upon the economic stability that could only be obtained by
a good working relationship between the Islamic state and its civil society.
Thus, while civil society distrusted the Islamic mobs, there was genuine respect for
Madani's integrity, and his willingness to adhere to established political rules. In fact,
while the FIS had rejected the possibility of coalition rule, it had a good record of
cooperating with other political parties in the attainment ofmutually satisfactory goals.
For example, when opposing the FLN's parliamentary gerrymandering, the FIS staged its
political protests in conjunction with movements as diverse as the FFS and the MDA.
Additionally, following the parliamentary victory, the FIS acted cautiously within the
boundaries of established political rules. As Yahia Zoubir writes, the FIS: 1) sought a
political compromise with the president; 2) attempted to reach an understanding with a
faction ofthe FIS; and 3) did not insist on Benjedid's resignation. 54
C. RADICAL ISLAM
The FIS's willingness to adhere to standard political rules would have done much
to alleviate the political violence that currently rages in Algeria. In all probability
however, had the FIS's victory been allowed to stand, the government would have still
faced a disloyal opposition. In fact, the problem would have been similar to that faced by
the FLN during the early days ofAlgerian independence. With its victory consolidated,
the FIS would have had to deal with the painful questions ofwho would rule, and what
interpretation of Sharia would the nation be subject. The FIS's neofundamentalists were
54 Ibid, p. 96.
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already distrustful of democracy and would have been extremely upset by the tolerance
and political compromise promised by Madani. Much as the Wilalya combatants had
initially refused to acquiesce to FLN's rule, the FIS would have had a difficult time
convincing the neofundamentalists-fundamentalists to accept a gentle interpretation of
Sharia.
However, while there is a high probability that political violence would have
emerged, it is extremely unlikely that it would be anywhere near the scale Algeria has
suffered over the past five years. A FIS victory would have brought increased legitimacy
and efficacy to the central government, limiting the disloyal opposition's ability to garner a
large following. Since the Algerian insurgency is domestic in nature, the militants would
therefore be isolated and largely ineffective. The lack ofpopular support would have
denied them access to safe areas and resources. As a result, Algeria would not have been
subject to the mass conflagration underway today. When the Islamic movement fractured,
the moderate faction could have retained control ofthe FIS and worked in conjunction
with mainstream political parties to maintain the support ofthe general populace.
With the coup however, any possibility of compromise between the Islamists, the
secular democrats, and the military was trampled. The situation quickly deteriorated into
open conflict, with civil society trapped between the Islamists and the army. For the
Islamists, the imprisonment or exile of its top leaders exacerbated the movement's
fragmentation. In fact, two completely different groups of militants emerged to challenge
the state. The first faction remained loyal to the FIS's imprisoned political leadership.
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This group was composed largely of fundamentalists, and had strongly endorsed the
political process. The second group drew its strength from Algeria's neofundamentalists.
They had always distrusted democracy, and declared jihad on the state, the FIS, or any
other group that failed to back the immediate implementation of a strictly Islamic society.
Some describe this as a mere division of labor; similar groups using different tactics to
achieve the same ends. 55 In reality however, these differences illustrate the diversity of
the Islamic movement. The variation in targets and tactics reflect differences in the
insurgent group's goals.
1. Roots of Resistance
The initial movement into political violence came from the remnants ofthe Bouyali
band. 56 During the late 1970s and early 1980s, this group of fundamentalists had waged
war against the socialist state through a series of irregular guerrilla campaigns. However,
the group was unable to achieve a mass following due to the large profits Algeria received
from its gas and oil exports. The FLN's rule was inefficient, but the revenue flow allowed
it to maintain its patronage networks quite well. As a result, the band was limited
tactically to harassing military outposts in the Atlas mountains and the Sahara Desert.
In 1987, state security was able to track down and kill the group's leader Mustapha
Bouyali. Without centralized command the movement quickly disintegrated. However,
55 This school of thought argues that democracy and Islam are incompatible, and that the West
should support those regimes facing an Islamic opposition. For an example see Daniel Pipes.
"There are No Moderates: Dealing with Fundamentalist Islam", The National Interest (Fall 1995)
56 Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algeria War", p. 27.
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the movement fragmented over leadership issues, not a crisis of belief. As a result, these
veterans were amongst the first to embrace the FIS when Benjedid liberalized the political
system. Given their history however, the Bouyalists were extremely suspicious ofthe
government's willingness to allow free and fair competition. This group felt Islamists
would have to be prepared to force the government to accept the will ofthe people. Thus,
the Bouyalists and their supporters began to collect and store weapons prior to the coup.
In fact, before the first round of elections had even taken place, Islamists were raiding
outlying military outposts. 57
When Madani and Benhadj were arrested, there was little the moderates could do
to dissuade this faction from returning to the military option. When the FIS was officially
banned, the Bouyalists turned to guerrilla activity as the only available strategic option.
This time however the bonds between state and society had frayed to the point where the
new militants received the type of support Mustapha Bouyali could have only dreamed
about. While the Bouyali band had been limited to raiding the periphery, the new groups
could strike at the heart ofthe state. Society would provide them with the necessary
materiel, safe houses, and intelligence to press their attacks.
2. The Armed Islamic Movement (MIA)
The militant wing ofthe FIS took a name at a 'congress' held in April 1992. 58 It
became the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) under the leadership offormer Bouyalist
57 Ibid, p. 27.
58 Ibid.
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Abdelkader Chebouti.59 Although some western analysts lump this group with the
extremists, the MIA is the closest to 'legitimate' combatants that can be found in Algeria.
At every step of its evolution the MIA has claimed that it remains loyal to the FIS
parliamentary mission in exile. Its military actions are designed to pressure the
government to negotiate with the Islamists, and whenever possible it informs the political
wing of its strategic intentions in advance. In fact, the political wing has traditionally had
the power to appoint the MIA's top leader. Indeed, following Chebouti's death, when
Madani Merzak was named the new leader, the MIA stressed that the only reason the
FIS's imprisoned leadership was not consulted was a breakdown in their communications
network.60
The MIA's goal is to force the military to negotiate with the FIS to end the current
impasse. This is important, not only because it clearly demonstrates the MIA's
subservience to the politicians ofthe FIS, but because it shows that the movement never
intended to seize power via revolutionary means. Indeed, while the MIA might possess
the political capability to mobilize popular support, it has steadfastly refused to insert itself
into the void left by the imprisonment or exile ofthe FIS' political leaders.
The best proof of this is found in the MIA's tactics and targeting. While the MIA
has had a number of opportunities to inflict damage, it is extremely selective about what
59 Hugh Roberts, "Algeria between Eradicators and Conciliators", Middle East Report. (July
1994) p. 24.
60 FBIS NES-95-052, "FIS Leaders not Consulted", Paris AFP (March 17 1995)
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comprises a valid target. This restraint is not due to lack of resources. Indeed, the
movement has consistently been able to maintain itselfby pillaging government supplies.
Instead it is due to the MIA's adherence to the FIS's political goals. Since the goal is to
force the government to negotiate a political solution, the MIA realizes that the FIS needs
the trust and support of civil society. When there is a good chance of collateral damage,
the MIA announces its intentions well before the campaign to give Algerian civilians a
chance to withdraw. A good example of this was a recent communique warning of
impending activity against the state-controlled gas and oil industry. Whenever possible,
the MIA attempts to avoid damage to non-government commercial interests, foreigners,
and society at large. As Hugh Roberts writes:
The MIA has been content to attack security forces and low-level functionaries,
especially local government officials appointed by the central government in place
of the elected FIS members. Its behavior has been consistent with a strategy of
applying pressure to make the regime regret its decision to ban the FIS and to
induce the government to readmit the substance of radical Islamism to the political
process."*
3. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
The caution and restraint exhibited by the MIA displeased the neofundamentalists.
To them, the MIA's political subservience and targeting limitations were clear signs that
the moderates lacked a real commitment to an Islamic Algeria. The neofundamentalists
had been distrustful of the democratic process from the beginning. Islam could not be
submitted to the whims of a capricious society; instead the people must be forced to
61 Roberts, p. 25.
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submit. When the army took over, and the FIS sought negotiations instead of Jihad, the
neofundamentalists felt betrayed. In this sector's opinion, FIS was no better than its
secular opponents. Instead of reaching a political settlement, the neofundamentalists
would force Algeria to accept their interpretation of Sharia at the point of a sword. As
Mortimer writes, "The descent into chaos marked the emergence of a second generation
of Islamic militants inspired, but not necessarily controlled by the FIS ofAbassi
Madani."62
The neofundamentalists coalesced into the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in early
1993. While the Bouyali band had been prominent in the formation ofthe MIA, the GIA
drew its leaders from Algerian veterans of Afghanistan. This is only fitting, because the
movement's organizational structure resembles that ofthe Mujahadeen. Although it is
often portrayed as a unified entity, the GIA is an umbrella organization of at least four
different groups. They share a common vision, but there is little coordination, centralized
control, or transfer of resources amongst their factions. As Roberts writes, "These groups
appear to be more or less autonomous but share a refusal to negotiate with the state and a
penchant for ferocious and savage attacks. "63
In fact, the GIA bears a closer resemblance to a criminal organization than a
political movement. Its factions are extremely defensive oftheir territorial claims, and
they have fought each other, as well as the government. It completely refuses to
"2 Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War", p. 27.
63 Roberts, p. 25.
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coordinate activities with the MIA. Indeed, when an element ofthe MIA defected to the
GIA, its leadership was 'tried' and executed. The GIA's suspicious nature meant that it
would accept combatants, but not any impingement upon its freedom of action.
While its internal working are flawed, the GIA has few problems maintaining a
high operational tempo. Despite its small numbers, the GIA is responsible for much ofthe
damage in Algeria today. While the MIA seeks to force a political solution, the GIA
wants to completely destabilize society. The GIA appears to pick individual targets at
random, but there is a distinct pattern to their operations. While it attacks government
facilities, the preferred target is civil society. This is the group that kills women for failing
to veil themselves in public. They are responsible for the assassinations ofjournalists,
Western-educated elites, and foreign business men. They seek to breed fear and distrust
amongst civil society, demonstrating that the corrupt and illegitimate government cannot
protect the people. The populace must accept Islam or suffer the consequences.
Furthermore, the GIA is the group that seeks to antagonize the West for its
support ofthe military. In October 1993, it summarily announced announced that any
foreigner found within Algeria's borders after December 1, 1993 would be slain.^4 Since
then more than 100 foreigners have been killed. Victims have ranged from the crew of an
Italian freighter anchored in Algiers, to foreign oil companies laboring in the Desert. By
raising the costs of doing business in Algeria, the GIA hoped to end Western involvement.
64 Alfred Hermida, "Killing Foreigners", Middle East International, (December 17, 1993) p. 11.
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Within the year however the group came to feel that a more direct approach was
necessary to dissuade the West. European countries had cut back their direct
involvement, but were still willing to give political and economic assistance to the military
run government. The only solution was to carry the battle to the homeland ofthe
government's major co-belligerent: France. The first international incident came with the
hijacking of an Air France A300 airbus on December 24, 1994. Five gunman seized the
plane as it prepared for departure from Algiers to Paris. As a sign ofgood faith, the
gunmen released 60 passengers before the plane was given permission to take off.
However, the authorization followed the deaths of three passengers including a French
diplomat.65 Due to the use of onboard systems during this 24 period, the plane no longer
had enough fuel to make it to Paris. As such, the plane was diverted to Marseilles, where
the GIA attempted to barter the lives of 150 other passengers, 40 ofwhom were French
citizens, for the release of 16 GIA militants held in French custody.66 After the gunmen
killed an additional hostage, French commandos stormed the plane, killing all five
terrorists. In response the GIA murdered four French priests in Algeria.6^
When this attempt failed, the GIA graduated to a more direct approach. On July
26, 1995, the GIA initiated the first in a series ofbombings on the Paris subway. In the
following months, five additional bombing attempts, three ofwhich were successful took
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place.68 In Europe, the bombings only heighten European uneasiness about the Algerian
crisis, and served to strengthen the opposition to the political Islam of the FIS. This
would clearly be counterproductive to a militant group attempted to force the government
to negotiate, which indicates the clear differences between the GIA and the FIS The GIA
cares only about the jihad, and carrying the war to the supporters of its enemies. It is not
interested in the public opinion battles waged by their moderate brethren.
D. FUTURE POLITICAL CONTROL
The GIA's independence and counterproductive tactics have bothered the FIS to
no end. While the GIA conducts terrorist operations, more often than not, the entire
Islamic movement is blamed for the event. In seeking to attain its goal, the GIA hinders
the FIS's attempt to capture civil society. As a result, the FIS has been very consistent in
.
its condemnation ofthe GIA's activities. In fact, its opposition to the GIA is so strong
that prior to the bombings, the FIS actually warned Europe that it feared that, "Some kind
of operation might take place in Britain or another European state to justify a campaign
against FIS supporters."69 As Abdelkarim Adda, a member ofthe FIS executive
committee noted:
The FIS does not object to the French Government's decision to pursue or
interrogate anyone who uses bombs to kill innocent people, since we reject
that both religiously and as a principal. . .We condemn any excesses or acts
of murder against innocent civilians, be they children, elderly women,
"° Robert Swann, "France: Tension Increases", Middle East International, (September 8, 1995)
p. 10.





Our problem is with those who denied the
people's choice and who are oppressing the people now. No one else is
our target. 7^
However, while the FIS has consistently denounced the GIA's actions, it has
refrained from condemning the group itself. The FIS's leadership in exile still believes that
it is possible to fuse the militant opposition into a single movement. 7 * Indeed, on
occasion the Washington representative, Anouar Haddam has even denied the existence of
the GIA, attributing the violence to the government or low level criminal activity.72
Government suppression ofthe FIS has weakened it to the point where it has difficulty
confronting the GIA. These militants do not recognize the legitimacy ofthe party's
parliamentary mission in exile, or accept limitations on their freedom of actions. As a
result the FIS is desperately attempting to co-opt the GIA, while downplaying its acts.
The only solution is to convince civil society to joint the FIS in pressuring the government
to negotiate a political solution. As Abdelkkarim Adda stated, "Ifthe causes ofthe
confrontation are eliminated, we believe that the causes ofthe deadlock will have been
eliminated . . . allowing the political jihad to return to the scene .... The armed Jihad is a
means not an end."73 In achieving this goal however, the FIS had to act soon. Attempts
70 FBIS-NES-95-202, "Adda on FIS Stance on Elections, Armed Actions", AL-SHARQ AL
AWSAT (October 18, 1995) p. 6.
71 FBIS-NES-95-058, "FIS Leader Urges Unification of Armed Groups", Paris Radio France
International (March 25, 1995)
72 FBIS-NES-96-067, "Algeria: Anouar Haddam on 'Two Trends' Within FIS", AL-SHARQ AL
AWSAT (hpri\ 4, 1996) p. 4.
73 FBIS-NES-95-202, p. 6.
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to co-opt the GIA had utterly failed, while the Algerian government was succeeding in its
attempt to convince the West that the FIS was responsible for the Islamic excesses. Ifthe
FIS could not strike a deal with civil society or the GIA, it would soon become irrelevant.
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IV. EUROPEAN CONSIDERATIONS
The army may have been the force that seized power, but they were not alone in
their opposition to a government formed by Islamists. Southern Europe was equally
concerned with Islamic revivalism in the Maghreb. As a result, these states played a crucial
role in the army's decision to seize power prior to the second round of elections.
Furthermore, Europe provided the broad economic and political support that has allowed
the government to survive the Islamic onslaught. As Laurence Whitehead noted,
'Transitions that pose no risk to the existing system of external alliances, or strengthen
economic ties are likely to succeed while transitions that threaten established interests are
less likely to receive the necessary support, even ifthe same principles apply."74 The
Islamic opposition may have had a legitimate claim to power, but they were viewed as a
threat to European social and economic interests. Thus, when given the opportunity to
participate in the Algerian crisis, the majority ofEuropean states threw their support
behind the military government. In doing so, European influence became a decisive factor
in the form and methods ofregime transformation.
A. HISTORICAL RELATIONS
European states are able to influence the outcome ofthe Algerian conflict due to
the long history of economic and societal linkage between Southern Europe and North
Africa. Despite Algeria's long and bloody struggle for independence, Southern European
74 Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization", Transitionsfrom
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe Schmitter, and
Laurence Whitehead, eds., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) p. 275.
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states, especially France emerged as its key partners for trade and development. Algeria
may have linked its politics to non-alignment and Third World socialism, but it carefully
linked its economic fortune to the Western capitalist states. In itself, this was not an
unusual arrangement. In fact, "The recent history ofpost-colonial states has been
characterized by political and economic ties with former metropoles."75 Although Algeria
has tried to diversify its economic relations, France and other Southern European nations
have remained at the forefront.
This has been the case since Algeria first gained its independence. Perversely, the
destruction inflicted by the colons was a key factor in France's ability to maintain strong
economic ties to independent Algeria. With the flight of colon knowledge and capital that
came with independence, Algeria needed outside assistance, and France was more than
willing to provide it. Maintaining close ties to Algeria was an important goal ofDe
Gaulle's. It would help to maintain French hegemony in North Africa and enhance French
stature amongst developing nations; a key policy goal after the recent loss oftwo colonial
wars. As a 1964 Le Monde article noted, Algeria was to be the French "doorway to the
Third World."76 Furthermore, close ties with Algeria would ensure French commercial
access to the recently discovered mineral wealth in the Sahara.
'^ Philip Akre, "Algeria and the Politics of Energy-Based Industrialization", State and Society in
Algeria, John Entelis and Phillip Naylor, eds., (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992) p. 73.
76 Phillip Naylor, "French-Algeria Relations 1980-1990", State and Society in Algeria, John
Entelis and Phillip Naylor, eds., (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992) p. 217.
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As a result ofAlgerian needs and French desires, there were more than 21,000
cooperants, or French aid programs, at work within Algeria during its first year of
independence.77 Throughout the early development phase, France and Algeria signed
bilateral agreements such as the Algiers Accord of 1965, and the Convention on
Technology and Cooperation of 1966. These allowed Algeria to develop the
infrastructure it desperately needed. In return the French were able to temporarily retain
the Saharan military bases vital to that nation's nuclear efforts and dominate Algerian
mineral extraction.
1. Algerian Diversification
At various times, Algeria did attempt to break this cycle of dependency. While
French mineral exploitation allowed Algeria to develop infrastructure, the nature ofthe
agreements vastly favored the French. Seeking to increase its share ofthe profits, Algeria
nationalized its gas and oil industries in 1971. This was the beginning of an attempt to
"turn from trade and economic cooperation dominated by France to a system of state
cooperation under specified controls with a diverse range of foreign suppliers of capital
and equipment."78 They were determined to broaden their international market to avoid
complete control by Southern European nations. Indeed, a lucrative French offer for gas
exploration following Algeria's nationalization was rejected outright.79
77 Naylor,p. 217.
78 Akre, p. 74.
79 Naylor,p. 217.
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The increased revenue from the nationalization ofAlgerian resources would play a
crucial role in Boumedienne's attempt to speed the industrialization of the Algerian
economy during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The government plan called for, "heavy
industrialization based on revenues gained from the hydro-carbon industry."80 For a
limited time, this solution worked. Arrangements such as the 1968 joint venture between
Algeria and the American-owned Getty Petroleum became the standard for foreign
companies. Sonatrach, the state-owned oil company, acquired a 5 1 percent share in Getty
operations in Algeria. Getty was also required to provided the money for further
exploration, and a share of future profits. 81 In return, Getty received guaranteed
production quotas, and exclusive marketing rights in the United States. By 1971, French
corporations were forced to meet similar requirements. That same year, Algeria was able
to expand the market for their second major commodity, natural gas. Algeria reached a
deal with the American-owned El Paso Company for the export of 15 billion cubic meters
ofnatural gas over a 25 year period. 82 Like Getty, El Paso would have exclusive rights to
market its products within the United States, and in return for finance the exploration of
additional gas deposits in Algeria. Through the use of such contracts, trade between
Algeria and the United States increased dramatically, and exploration companies began to
80 Akre, p. 78.
81 Ibid, p. 89.
82 Ibid, p. 79.
70
import the necessary equipment to explore for further gas and oil deposits. By 1976, the
United States had replaced France as Algeria's largest trading partner.
2. Free Market Problems
Algeria may have diversified its consumer base, but its export income was still
completely dependent upon a single commodity. Basing heavy industrialization upon such
financing is a very risky undertaking. The international economy is not bound by any
commitments to develop the less fortunate states. Instead, consumers want the best
product at the lowest possible price. Thus, this arrangement might suffice when there is a
high demand for that export commodity, but when the market implodes, impartial trading
partners will not be bound by the sympathies ofthe developing state's former colonial
master.
Any fluctuations in gas and oil prices would produce severe consequences for
Algeria. Oil revenues paid for some development, but they also provided the collateral for
massive foreign loans taken in order to speed the process. Financing ofthe foreign debt
had risen from 3.2% of export income in 1970 to 24.9% in 1980. 83 By 1982, its total
foreign debt had risen to 7.7 billion. 84 If Algeria was unable to generate sufficient
revenue from its single sector export, it would be unable to finance its foreign debt and
forced to abandon the important industrialization efforts. When the United States and
Western Europe were hit with recessions in the early 1980s, Algeria found itself in that
83 Ibid, p. 92.
84 Ibid, p. 92.
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exact quandary. It needed to maintain a strong cash flow to finance its foreign debt, while
the buyers for its sole export commodity were unwilling to increase their purchases.
Algeria's solution was an attempt to link the price ofAlgerian liquefied natural gas
(LNG) to oil prices. This would have brought the price per cubic meter up to $6. 1 1,
nearly double the previous rate. 85 Such maneuvering did not sit well with Algeria's
American customers, especially in light ofthe Mexico's financial crisis. In order to stave
off financial disaster, Mexico was selling gas and oil at remarkably reduced rates;
American companies could not only secure less expensive resources, they would have
lower shipping costs. In 1980, contract negotiations with the El Paso company broke
down. Its lucrative export arrangements were canceled, and American companies began
to withdraw from the Algerian market. Algeria's export economy was once again based
solely upon the European market.
3. The Reemergence of Europe
The loss ofthe American market had tremendous repercussions for Algeria.
It was forced to swallow its pride and accept a return to trade dominated by Europe.
With their historical ties, these states would be more willing to accommodate mutual
interests. Algeria needed European cash, while Europe needed Algerian energy. This
arrangement provided short term solutions, but created even more long term problems.
Algeria needed this cash to pay off debts incurred during the expansion of its gas and oil
industries during the 1970's. In the long run however, such arrangements allowed the
85 Naylor, p. 222.
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Europeans to influence Algerian decisions as to which sectors received further
development. It should be of little surprise that the areas in which European states wanted
to invest were gas and oil exploitation. In such a system of dependency the sectors that
deal with the outside world often receive the majority ofthe revenue.
This second phase ofEuropean dependency was even more difficult on Algeria
than the first. The attempts at industrialization had dramatically restructured the
population. The urban population had quadrupled while rural agriculture had been terribly
neglected. In fact, by the 1980s, Algeria could no longer sustain itself; it was forced to
import food as well as manufactured goods. Throughout the decade, the nations of
Southern Europe expanded their political and economic links with Algeria. More than
75% ofthe Algeria's exports went to the European community; more than 50% to
Southern Europe alone. 86 In return however, the Maghreb played a minimal role in
European trade. The entire region accounts for only 1% ofEuropean exports.87
The nature ofAlgeria's exports however, create a different reality than
the statistics might indicate. Europe draws upon North Africa to meet a large percentage
of its energy needs. This has been the case since 1983, when the first Trans-
Mediterranean gas pipeline began pumping. This pipeline ships Algerian natural gas to
Italy via a conduit that extends through Tunisia and under the Mediterranean. Today
86 Claire Spencer, The Maghreb in the 1990s: Political and Economic Developments in Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia (London: Brassey's Press, 1993), p. 51.
87 Ibid, p. 51.
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work is underway to double the capacity of that pipeline, and a second is under
construction for delivery of gas to Spain. In the future, the European Union hopes to link
these lines to existing European networks, allowing more effective delivery to Portugal,
France, and Germany.
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B. EUROPE AND ISLAM
This new phase of economic relations between Europe and Algeria was more
symbiotic than dependent. Algeria needed European technology and financial assistance
for its development, but soaring energy requirements made Europe equally dependent on
Algerian resources to meet its domestic energy needs. The Trans-Med pipeline currently
provides more than 25% of Italy's domestic energy needs. 89 Projections are that it will be
°° Data obtained from Warren True, "Trans-Med expansion nears start-up; Maghreb line nears
construction", Oil and Gas Journal (Jan 17, 1994) pp. 50-51.
89 Ibid, p. 51.
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30% by the year 2000. 90 The Spanish pipeline under development has been identified by
the government as the crucial element in easing the energy problems resulting from the
1990 failure of Spain's experimental reactor. 91
The increased reliance upon Algeria's energy resources created enormous security
problems for Southern Europe. Just as the United States is forced to maintain the political
viability ofPersian Gulf regimes to guarantee its oil, Europe had to maintain North African
stability to ensure its natural gas supply. Thus, when the FLN began to lose control in
1988, the likelihood ofpolitical transition made European states nervous. They analyzed
the regime's stability with regard to how its collapse would impact their needs. Thus,
while they encouraged the formation of democratic systems, they worried about the
effects ofregime transition. European states and businesses had become quite adept at
dealing with the patrimonial state-owned corporations that controlled the Algerian
economy. Any transition that threatened these arrangements would be received very
poorly.
Their fears were confirmed when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) emerged as the
main opposition. This Islamic-based organization presented two distinct problems that
forced Southern European states to rethink their security situation. First, the FIS was a
direct threat to Europe's supply ofNorth African natural gas. Leaders such as Ah Benhadj
90 Warren True, "Spain marking Progress in Expansion of Natural Gas Grid, Utilization", Oil and
Gas Journal (July 25, 1994) p. 32.
91 Aaron Segal. "Spain and the Middle East: A 15-Year Assessment", Middle East Journal, vol.
45 no. 2 (Spring 1991) p. 258.
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had repeatedly threatened to "punish the Europeans for their colonial rule."92 European
dependence upon Algerian gas had reached such a level that this alone would have meant
European opposition. There was however an equally compelling reason. The possibility
of a fundamentalist state within a few hundred miles of their borders made the Southern
European nations fearful that they would face an influx ofrefugees, which would increase
the size and alter the nature oftheir Moslem populations. The proximity made Europeans
aware ofthe differences between themselves and their ethnic minorities. As B.A.
Roberson ofWarwick University writes:
European countries in the postwar ear have become unintentionally multi-
cultural and multi-ethnic. This has led to a blurring of the boundary between
Europe and its periphery. The periphery has arrived in the heart of Europe.
Although migrations have been recurring events in Europe, what makes them
particularly cogent in the present situation has been their magnitude and
character, and the economic conditions within which they have occurred. . .
In these circumstances, the immigrant communities emerge as social
problems. "3
European states feared the linkages that they believed existed between their ethnic
minorities, and Islamic movements abroad. France has a Moslem population ofmore than
three million people, ofwhich more than one million are ofAlgerian descent. 94 Italy's
Moslem residents, mostly Tunisian, number more than 200,000.95 Spain's population is
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less ethnically diverse, but it realizes that its geographic location will make it the conduit
for North Africans seeking refuge in France. At its closest point Spain is less than 30
miles from North Africa. As a result, it has already begun to run anti-smuggling patrols in
the Strait of Gibraltar.
The nations of Southern Europe truly believed that political problems in North
Africa would be detrimental to the Mediterranean as a whole. As an Economist editorial
ofthe time noted, "It is only a matter oftime before North Africa's troubles wash up on
Europe's shores."9^ This is most visible in some ofthe more recent exercises held by the
Western European Union (WEU). In exercises TRAMONTANA (1995) and ARDENT
(1994), Spain, France and Italy undertook combined force operations practicing large
scale evacuations, and sea area control; efforts clearly driven by the projected social
problems they believe collapse in Algeria would produce for themselves.97
Fear of their own immigrant populations is most probably unfounded. As
Roberson writes, "Government perceptions do not correspond with the fact that their
immigrant communities are stable. . .they have been distorted by Islamist activities
elsewhere that have occasionally impinged on European policies."98 However, as with
much in politics, the reality is not as important as the perception. Reactionary politicians
such as Jean Marie Le Pen ofthe National Front in France can garner additional support
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by flaming fears of an invasion of hostile, uncivilized, Algerian refugees. For example, a
French poll conducted in 1990 revealed that 61% ofthe population associated Islam with
violence." With an angry and upset majority, and the threat of being outflanked by their
political opponents, politicians are less likely to be accommodating to the Islamists. For
their own political survival, European politicians would be forced to address the fears of
their populace. As a result, while continually expanding economic support for North
Africa, European nations have attempted to isolate them socially. France began the trend
in the winter of 1989 and was soon followed by the United Kingdom and Italy. 10° Spain
followed suit in May 1991. 101 Today it is nearly impossible for an Algerian to receive a
French visa. Due to the widespread social violence and attacks on foreign nationals,
France has closed its consulates to the general public. Visa applications must be mailed,
and 80% ofthese requests are denied. 1(^ From a high of 800,000 visas in 1988, France
issued less than 100,000 in 1995. 103
In this respect, domestic politics was an equally important factor in the European
governments' decision to act against the democratic forces in Algeria. To Europe, the
fear of Islamic revivalism was as important as the economic threat posed by the potential
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loss oftheir energy source. European states were not capable of accepting the growth in
their minority communities that they believed would occur due to refugees from
fundamentalism. The French position stated in 1994 sums up the European position quite
nicely. As French foreign minister Alain Juppe, one ofthe more moderate politicians
stated, "Generosity and fine sentiments are all very well, but the realities ofthe social
balance in France also need to be taken into consideration. . France cannot do
everything."104 Southern Europeans needed to protect their interests, and were willing to
resort to supporting non-democratic movements to do so.
C. EUROPEAN INFLUENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
As a result, when it became apparent that the FIS would win the elections and gain
control ofthe Algerian government, European states were concerned. They could afford a
principled stand on democratization in Latin American and Eastern Europe but regime
change in Algeria directly threatened their interests. Democracy in Latin America and
Eastern Europe meant market expansion and increased opportunities for trade and
development. In Algeria however, the FIS had already sworn to restructure the state's
economic relations with Europe. Its desire to break up Algeria's inefficient centralized
economy would have meant the end to the patrimonial system through which European
companies gained access to Algerian markets. Europe's perception was that the
democratic process would instill an equally authoritarian regime on its periphery, the
difference being that an Islamic government would now be opposed to European interests.
1°4
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Southern European states were concerned about an influx of refugees and the level of
control the fundamentalist state would have over their energy needs. As a result, Algerian
democratization was unacceptable and Europeans welcomed the military coup.
At most stages in the conflict's evolution, European states, led by France, gave
unwavering supported to the military regime. Additionally, these states expended a great
deal ofpolitical capital to convince other nations to do the same. European actions
ranged from political cover for the military's excessive repression to actively encouraging
foreign investors to refinance loans and expand development. Without this assistance, the
military regime would not have had sufficient access to the financial and political resources
necessary to withstand the onslaught ofthe fundamentalists. In effect, Southern European
support was the key factor in the conflict's longevity. The willingness ofthese states to
support the military regime, despite the high cost to their own economic and security
interests, allowed the military regime to pursue a hard-line policy. Furthermore, when key
actors within the regime showed signs ofweakening, European influence ensured that
there would be little chance of compromise with the insurgents.
1. Financial Assistance
One key aspect ofEuropean support has been its willingness to give the military
regime the ability to finance its war. By the 1991 coup, Algeria's foreign debt had
ballooned to $21 billion. 1°^ During tne next four years it increased at an annual rate of
105 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook - 1991, (Washington DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1992) p. 5.
80
$1.5 billion. 10^ The government had instituted a 'war economy' to pursue the
fundamentalist opposition. Despite this, Algeria never defaulted on its foreign loans.
Whenever the government approached collapse, the European states would provide
massive amounts of foreign aid or assist Algeria by restructuring its foreign debt.
Ofthe two, debt restructuring was the more important. The $1 billion per year in
aid given by France since the start ofthe crisis pales in comparison to the financial rewards
of debt restructuring. 107 In this respect, the Paris Club ofgovernment creditors has been
the most important institution. This French sponsored organization is a "multilateral
forum established to help developing countries restructure their debts to governments and
official guaranteed export credits." 10 ** Members include all the major European economic
powers as well as Canada, the United States, and Japan. Its client base is all of developing
world, but the real focus of its efforts are former French colonies. Through the use ofthis
institution, the military regime and its European friends were able to reach the
accommodations that eased Algeria's debt burden. Between 1991 and 1993, the Paris
Club was instrumental in reprofiling $2.7 billion in Italian debt and $1.5 billion in French
debt. 109 In 1994 it followed up these successes by rescheduling more than $5 billion
106 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook - 1994, (Washington DC:
U.S.Government Printing Office, 1995) p. 6.
107 Matthew Connelly. "Deja Vu All Over Again: Algeria, France and Us", The National Interest,
(Winter 1995/96) p. 33.
108 Thomas Klein. "Innovation in Debt Relief: The Paris Club", Finance and Development.
(March 1992) p. 42.
109 Jon Marks. "Against the Clock: Algeria reprofiles its debt", The Banker. (November, 1994) p.
74.
81
dollars in Algerian loans. 1 10 States participating in these arrangements included Canada,
Germany, Spain, and Italy. 1 1
J
When totaled, Paris Club restructuring eliminated or rescheduled more than 25%
of Algeria's foreign debt. These actions lowered Algeria's debt service ratio, which
allowed it to devote more of its export earnings to the war against fundamentalism
Furthermore, restructuring its debt made Algeria a more viable candidate for other forms
of outside loans and assistance. Within months ofthe 1994 Paris Club negotiations,
Algeria successfully negotiated a $ 1 billion loan from the international Monetary Fund
(IMF) for infrastructure development.
The European effort to help Algeria went far beyond influencing their own
institutions. Time and again European states tied the Algerian situation to their own
economic interests and prestige. They actively pressured their own trading partners to
increase investment or reschedule Algerian loans. The clearest example of this was a trip
by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe to Japan in 1995. His linkage ofAlgerian
economics and French trade was crucial in persuading Japan to reschedule 450 million
dollars of debt. 1 "
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2. Maintenance of the Hegemonic Sphere
European support for Algeria's military regime was not limited to economic
assistance. In conjunction with financial aid, there was a strong push to garner
international political support for the military regime. As one would expect, France was
often the leader ofthis effort. Throughout the crisis, French officials often met openly
with their Algerian counterparts. As an article in Le Monde noted after Phillipe Seguin,
the Speaker of the French National Assembly visited Algeria in 1995, "the symbolic
importance. . . is a way of showing that Paris clearly supports the regime."* * 3 France
was not alone in these efforts. International events such as a 1993 Spanish conference on
Mediterranean trade also highlights the importance than Southern Europe places on the
Algerian regime. By demonstrating the importance, and raising international awareness,
Southern European states can force other regional actors to become involved. This is
very important, for the larger the international coalition backing the military regime, the
lower the appearance that Southern Europe is controlling the conflict unilaterally.
This has been a consistently difficult task. At most, other European states have
given lukewarm support to Southern European policies. As a Le Monde article stated in
1995, 'Trance, alongside Spain, Portugal, and Italy, is contributing a Mediterranean
sensibility which is lacking in its Northern European allies." 1 14 The European states
113
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without Algeria on their periphery did not treat it as a significant problem Chaos in
Bosnia and the economic development ofEastern Europe were more important.
Furthermore, the expanded power ofthe European Union complicated the Southern
European states' ability to influence their neighbors.
The structural changes brought about by the ratification ofthe Maastricht Treaty
altered intra-European relations considerably. The Maastricht Treaty greatly enhanced the
power ofthe European Presidency to determine common foreign policy. Furthermore, the
Presidency would revolve amongst member states every six months. Whichever state held
the Presidency had a great deal of control in detennining Europe's international agenda
during that period. When Southern European states held power, political and economic
issues dealing with the Maghreb became important. When Central or Northern European
states were in charge, the focus was more likely to be Eastern Europe.
The reluctance of other regional actors to become entangled has not been the most
pressing problem for Southern Europe. There is enough cross-linkage within the
framework ofthe European Union to ensure that a neighboring state's failure to support
the Southern European approach does not translate into an independent policy. The
British have been openly reluctant to participate in some ofthe refinancing efforts, but
have continued to support French policies. As British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd
noted, "In [the] Maastricht [Treaty] France and Great Britain refused to subordinate their
foreign policies to a community structure or majority voting system but that does not
prevent us from working with our partners . . . the Europe ofnations must work together
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closely." 1 15 Instead, the problem has been preventing the United States from more than a
participatory role in the economic and political solutions to the Algerian crisis.
3. Europe as a Co-Belligerent
In light ofthe economic, military, and political assistance given to the military
regime by European states, there is little wonder that these nations came to be perceived
as co-belligerents. Arguments such as, "the military regime that usurped Algeria's first
free elections must be given a chance or there will be no hope for democracy, economic
development, and continued French influence," made it clear that Europe would be
unwilling to accept a compromise based on the merits ofthe Islamic movement. 1 16 Since
European states behaved as co-belligerents, targeting their business interests within
Algeria was a logical step for the Islamic militants. The first warning ofimpending action
came in October 1993, when the radical Armed Islamic Group (GIA) announced that any
foreigner within Algeria's borders after December 1, 1993 would be slain. 1 17 To date,
more than 100 foreigners, mostly French, have been killed. When these measures proved
H5
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ineffective, militants began direct targeting ofthe military regime's European supporters.
Actions such as the summer 1995 Paris subway bombings help to highlight the growing
animosity toward European interference amongst the radical Islamic elements.
However, the enmity ofthe GIA was not responsible for Europe's eventual policy
change with regard to the military regime. Instead, it was the United States' attempt to
involve itself in the political dialogue. Low level talks between American diplomats and
the FIS led Europe to call for open elections in Algeria. American involvement posed a
direct threat to the hegemonic sphere Europe held over Algeria. This was readily attested
to during the French presidential elections, when both candidates agreed that American
involvement meant that the United States would, "stick France with the 'Great Satan'
label by courting Islamists and maneuvering so that Paris appear[ed] to be the only
support for the military junta in Algiers. "* **> Since an Islamic government remained
unacceptable, the Southern European nations needed to find a plan that prevented the FIS
from gaining power, but increased the legitimacy ofthe Algerian political system Ifthey
could not find an acceptable solution, they truly faced the possibility ofbecoming
irrelevant. The West was willing to support Southern European interests, but every
endeavor has its limits. IfFrance was unable to settle the conflict, then other interested
parties would attempt to negotiate a solution independently.
1 18
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V. SOCIETAL-BASED EQUILIBRATION:
SAN 'EGIDIO AND THE NATIONAL PACT
In most examinations ofAlgeria's stalled transition, analysts have focused upon the
actions ofthe military regime and the Islamic militants, to the detriment ofthose factions
of civil society that reject the extremism ofboth camps. This is unfortunate, for while civil
organizations are not party to the military conflict, they are essential to the creation of a
political solution. Indeed, the desire to garner support from civil society has made it the
focal point of conflict for both the military and the Islamists. While both sides have
vacillated between policies that repressed or attempted to co-opt civil society, neither has
lost sight of its importance.
While both military and Islamic zealots have been able to garner some support
from societal organizations, neither has been able to impose a political settlement. While
this has partially resulted from the military strength ofboth sets of combatants, it also is a
result of civil society's unwillingness to accept anything less then the political liberalization
promised by President Benjedid during the first round of democratization.
Both sets of combatants realize that civil society is the linchpin to solving the
Algerian political crisis. Whichever side is able to gain the trust ofpopulace and the
nongovernmental elites will have the strength to resist the military pressures ofthe other.
However, in the five years between the canceled 1991 parliamentary elections and the
1996 presidential elections, neither side was able to accomplish this goal. The Algerian
people have remained 'uncaptured' by either the Islamists or the military because the vast
majority of civil society refuses to accept the authoritarian systems proposed by the
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military and the Islamic radicals. Faced with extremism on both sides, the non-
governmental elites have attempted to maintain their own extremely diverse coalition,
working toward the installation of democracy.
In January 1995, civil society produced its own plan for equilibration when the
secular political opposition negotiated the platform ofRome with the FIS. Although the
government has since outflanked civil society's efforts, the Rome conference is still
relevant to the Algerian crisis. In light ofthe flaws in the government's plan, the Platform
ofRome still offers the best chance for resolution ofthe Algerian conflict.
A. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
When interim president Mohammed Boudiafwas assassinated in June 1992,
whatever chance the government had to capture civil society died with him. Although
Boudiaf came to power via the military, he was acceptable to civil society. In fact, one of
his first proposals was a government of national reconciliation that would allow political
organization that rejected violence to participate. He was willing to reach out not only to
the secular political parties, but to the moderates within the FIS who had been denied their
electoral legitimacy. With his death, the government no longer contained any personalities
capable of reaching out to civil society with any credibility. Although there were certainly
moderates within the military-sponsored government that succeeded Boudiaf they could
not guarantee that their viewpoint would be carried by the entire institution, and thus
could not be trusted.
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1. Civil Proponents
However the attempts by both the Islamic extremists and the military government
to co-opt or suppress civil society did not lead to the complete demise ofindependent
political thought. Although the secular opposition was marginalized, its leaders were still
highly respected, and could not be thrown in jail for arbitrary reasons like the leaders of
the FIS. As such, although their mobilization capacities were limited, these groups were
able to maintain not only their domestic support, but access to Western governments.
These individuals refused to compromise their positions to ease the troubles ofthe
state. In addition to preventing the FIS from taking power, the military coup also
prevented the secular opposition from assuming national office for the first time in their
history. Thus, while some ofthe Islamic rhetoric threatened democracy, the military had .
already shown that it would not accept its meaning. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the
joint opposition to the FLN's parliamentary district gerrymandering, the secular political
parties already knew that it was possible to work with the FIS. Its leaders were much
more willing to compromise than the military. Thus, "Several parties and associations
believed that democracy could be constructed only on the foundation of a negotiated
settlement. "* ^ To end the conflict, civil society would have to create a pact that
accommodated the moderates on both sides of the conflict. Ifthe pact captured a large
enough percentage of the Algerian population, then the extremists would be isolated both
militarily and politically. With common ground discovered, and appropriate rules
119 Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War." p. 29.
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established, Algeria could then move forward toward solving the economic and social ills
that plagued the state.
2. Key Societal Organizations
Before civil society could influence the outcome ofthe conflict, it had to discover
what common ground existed amongst its members. The myriad ofpolitical parties, the
diversity of opinions, and general disorganization prevented the emergence of a coherent
dialogue for the first four years ofthe conflict. In the 1991 election, no secular party came
close to reaching the number ofpopular votes for the FIS. Parties were organized around
regional identities or minor issues that were unable to build mass followings. To match
the strength and organizational power ofthe military and the Islamists, the political
opposition had to find common causes and principles around which they could unite. In
this respect, an introduction to the main proponents ofthe civil pact is in order,
a. The FLN as an Opposition Party
At first glance the FLN would seem to be a poor candidate for Algeria's
political opposition. Since it was the party ofthe old regime, it could not lay claim to any
democratic heritage. Its thirty year rule of Algeria, and domination ofthe flawed
transition were responsible for the social conditions and the subsequent coup that led the
people to overwhelmingly support the FIS. Furthermore, its leader Abd al-Hamid Mihri
was a stalwart member ofthe old guard, closely associated with the bureaucratic author-
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itarianism of former president Houari Boumedienne. The result was that the party's,
"policies and personnel were suspect to a large number of Algerians. " 12^
However, even though there was the appearance of continuation atop the
FLN's organizational structure, real change had occurred amongst the rank and file.
President Chadli Benjedid's political reforms had weakened the party's bureaucratic wing
by reducing government subsidization and party infrastructure. Further political
maneuvering had led to the military's withdrawal from the party. The end result was that
the iron triangle ofparty-bureaucracy-military had been reduced to an organization of
politicians and reformers. As such, it was hard for the FLN to accept a detente with the
rnilitary following the coup. Benjedid's reforms had been designed to give the FLN's
political wing increased power to influence Algeria's future. Accepting a subordinate
position to the army would have been the antithesis of this goal.
Additionally, by negating the election, the military denied the FLN
whatever electoral legitimacy it had won. The FLN's gerrymandering may have led to the
loss ofmany parliamentary districts, but it still received almost 25% ofthe popular vote in
the 1991 elections. 121 As a result, whatever its faults in the eyes ofmany Algerians, the
FLN remained the second political party in numbers. With the destruction ofthe iron
triangle, and the loss of their own electoral legitimacy, the politicians ofthe FLN
120 Ibid, p. 30.
121 Ibid.
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condemned the military's dissolution of the political process. From the day ofthe coup
the party began to perceive itself as an opposition movement.
b. The Socialist Forces Front and Regional Identity
While the FLN was suspect in the minds ofthe general populace, there was
no question as to the credibility ofthe Socialist Forces Front (FFS). However, this
movement's organizational identity gave it wider name recognition internationally than
domestically. The party was founded at independence by Husayn Ayat Ahmad, a leader of
the Algerian revolution who opposed the autocratic tendencies ofthe FLN's leadership.
Although it was officially banned, the party survived the three decades ofthe FLN's
hegemonic rule. Unfortunately, the factors that enabled the party to survive the FLN's
hegemony prevented it from building a mass following when Algeria began to liberalize its
political system
The FFS was able to survive the FLN's autocratic rule because of its
strong regional and ethnic affiliations. "Although never a separatist party, [the FFS] had an
ethnic/regional base in Kabylie, a mountainous region east of Algiers, and among Kabyles
(Berbers) elsewhere."122 Thus, while the movement's cultural affiliation amongst ethnic
Berbers allowed it to survive the single party state, it did not provide a wide enough base
of support for democratic competition. Indeed, the party's strong showing during the
1991 election resulted more from the FLN's gerrymandering than from the FFS's
widespread appeal. The FFS placed second to the FIS, winning a total of 25 seats, but
122 Ibid, p. 29.
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received barely 500,000 votes. 123 By way of contrast, the FLN received more than
1,500,000 votes. 124
The FFS's inability to transition from a regional organization to a national
political party is regrettable. Although the party is formed around the concept of
intellectual and cultural rights for Algeria's Berber population, it has had, "a long-standing
stance in favor ofpluralist democracy. "12^ It opposed the extremism ofthe FIS, but was
equally opposed to the cancellation ofthe election. Throughout the civil war, the FFS
would provide the political center for civil society as it attempted to forge its own solution
independent ofthe excesses ofthe military and the Islamists.
c An Independent Media?
The military's view of security was such that it wanted to control nearly
every aspect ofthe media, despite the fact that, "a significant proportion ofthe press was
also firmly Islamist."12^ The result has not only been the stifling of Islamic views, but of
those ofthe secular opposition as well. Media restrictions began shortly after the coup,
and continue to this day due to a 1993 law that allows authorities to, "ban newspapers
with reports that threaten national security and public order."127 The May 7, 1996
123 Ibid.
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seizure ofthe Algerian daily El Watan is an excellent example. The newspaper was
confiscated for reporting a gunbattle between the military and the GIA in a suburb of
Algeria. Since the government did not want the battle publicized, it did not issue a press
release, and thus the supposedly independent press was not authorized to report on the
clash. The ability to control the media is greatly enhanced by government monopolies on
the means ofproduction. The government owns all 16 printing presses within Algeria. * 28
Media control has hindered the efforts ofindependent political actors to
present their proposals to society or to appreciate the true extent ofthe divisions amongst
state elites. From the other side, the GIA's propensity to target any journalist also aids
self-censorship. Thus, when civil organizations spoke for the restoration ofthe
democratic process, and voiced their opposition to the atrocities ofthe Islamists and the
military, they found themselves targeted by both. As Salima Ghezali, the female managing
editor ofthe Algerian daily La Nation noted:
If there is a clash, if someone is murdered, we cannot do our own investigation;
we cannot send reporters, we cannot ask witnesses to tell us what they have seen.
If one does, the newspaper is suspended for between 40 days and 6 months, you
never know the length of the ban you are risking. Any information concerning
security matters must come from the official government news agency. We can
only reprint official communiques.
™
Limiting the independence ofthese key actors may be a useful way for the
state to control the flow of information, but it does little to capture the society's trust.
The radical Islamists erred by attacking secular elites. The state faired worse by creating a
128 Ibid.
129 Chns Kutschera. "A Lonely and Deadly Game." The Middle East, (July 1995) p. 35.
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climate of fear and distrust. The failure to capture civil society meant that neither side was
able to declare victory.
B. THE PLATFORM OF ROME
The inability of either side to crush the independence of secular political actors
provided the opportunity for the best chance at political reconciliation. After more than
three years of conflict, the situation was deteriorating toward a mutually hurting stalemate.
As Rebah Kebir, the FIS's European representative noted in January 1995, "Neither the
Army nor the Islamic opposition is capable of obtaining a military victory today."*-^ The
conflict could only be resolved through a settlement that allowed the competing groups a
stake in the process, and the right to participate. A framework making this basic
requirements emerged in November 1994, when the main dissent groups met in Rome.
1. The Role of San 'Egidio
At this point in the conflict, talks between the military and the FIS's imprisoned
leadership had broken off. The military refused to release the party's leaders until societal
violence had ceased, while the FIS leadership refused to call for an end to political
violence until their rights to participate in the political process had been restored. As a
result, the regime's vaunted plan for national dialogue was an abject failure. Since the FIS
was unable to participate, the secular opposition refused to attend. They realized any
settlement that excluded the FIS would be useless. However, the opening offered by the
130 FBIS-NES-95-014 "FIS Leadership on Foreign Support, Rome Accord." Radio France
International (January 21, 1995)
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military gave civil society's members the opportunity to explore what commonalties
existed amongst their organizations. Thus when the Catholic community of San 'Egidio
offered its services toward mediation ofthe conflict, a number of political parties
accepted.
San 'Egidio is a religious fellowship with a long history of conflict mediation.
Amongst its past successes was the negotiation ofthe end to the Mozambican civil war in
1992. Thus it brought a record of impartiality and credibility to negotiations. By serving
as an honest broker, San 'Egidio could help break down the walls of distrust and suspicion
that had previously kept the opposition from cooperating.
2. Preliminary Talks
The first round of talks were held in Rome in late November 1994. Amongst the
participants were Husayn Ayat Ahmad ofthe FFS, Abd al-Hamid Mihri ofthe FLN, Ben
Bella ofthe Movement for Democracy in Algeria, and Anwar Haddam ofthe FIS. Thus,
the "Colloquium for Algeria" represented more than 85% ofthe popular electorate ofthe
canceled 199 1 elections. " * Whatever framework the talks produced could not be
ignored by the government or the international community. At the conference's
conclusion, the participants released a statement agreeing to four broad principles: 1) the
rejection ofviolence as a medium of conflict resolution, 2) support for democracy, 3)
1->1 Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War." p. 33.
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open competitive elections, and 4) respect for human rights. 132 A second round oftalks
were scheduled for January 1995.
The second round ofnegotiations was necessary so party leaders could return and
consult with their members prior to any actual commitment. In the case ofthe FIS, the
matter was further complicated by the imprisonment ofthe party's top leadership.
However, Robert Mortimer asserts that Abd al-Hamid Mihri, the secretary general ofthe
FLN, was allowed to visit both Madden and Benhadj, and was able to bring a letter
delineating their positions. 133 The FIS's commitment to dialogue is most noted by
Benhadj' s changed stance on democracy. Mihri was apparently, "stupefied by the political
evolution of a man like Benhadj whose position had become much more pragmatic in the
face ofthe threat ofthe GIA."134
Indeed, convincing the rest ofthe world that it was committed to democracy
appears to have been the FIS's primary goal in the second Rome conference. Since the
military coup, the party had been described as the medium through which Algeria would
be transformed into a second Iran. Ifthe Islamic movement was to have any chance of
success, it had to find a way to gain access to Western governments in spite ofthe
terrorist acts ofthe GIA. As Mortimer notes:
132 Ibid, p. 35.
133 Ibid, p. 36.
134 Jean-Paul Man. "Rome le Labynnthe de la paix." Le Nouvel Observer (19-25 January 1995)
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The real task of the San 'Egjdio was to demonstrate that the FIS was
ready to commit itself to respect the basic freedoms of a democratic
society. The premise of the Rome conferees was that if this were obtained,
the government then ought to be prepared to lift the ban on the Islamist
party, which in turn would enable to call for an end to the violence. "^
Thus, the conference would need to enhance the FIS's domestic legitimacy, and
install some international legitimacy. It had to convince the government to negotiate with
the FIS, and persuade the international community that the FIS would accept a democratic
framework. The only was to accomplish this goal was for the movement to commit itself
to a common set of rules negotiated with the secular opposition.
3. A National Pact
The second round of talks took the commonalties discovered at the first round and
transformed them into a tangible political framework. The result was the Platform of
Rome. The Platform was a six part document announcing the shared values and principles
ofAlgeria's political opposition. Chief amongst its objectives was, "the rejection of
violence as a means of gaining or retaining power."136 Thus the platform, "implicitly
condemned both the armed Islamists and the governing authorities while placing the
political parties on the high ground ofnon-violence." 1 37 The FIS's rejection ofviolence
as a means of obtaining power is extremely significant. In the past, the movement's
leaders refused to call offthe Jihad until Islamists had the right to participate in Algerian
135 Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War." p. 35
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politics unfettered. This marked the first separation between the political moderates ofthe
FIS and the militants ofthe GIA. Instead of attempting to cover the excesses committed
in the name of Islam, the FIS acknowledged that it had more in common with the secular
opposition than the militants that were threatening state and society. Earlier differences
with the FFS were repaired the recognition ofthe cultural rights ofthe Berbers. 138
Through their actions, the FIS displayed its willingness to accepting civil society over the
Islamic militants. The movement showed that if it achieved power, it was likely to abide
by the mutually agreed upon political processes, respecting the pact's second plank that
called upon the signatories to, "respect a multi-party system and alternation in power."139
C. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
On its merits, the Platform ofRome seemed to be an excellent medium for ending
the conflict. By providing a framework that called for the respect of individuals and
political organizations to participate, the national pact was one that attempted to, "move
the polity toward democracy by democratic means."140 Such an arrangement results
when, "No social or political group is sufficiently dominant to impose its 'ideal project'
and what emerges is a second-best solution which none ofthe actors wanted, but which all
ofthem can agree to and share in."141 Since its signatories represented a wide diversity of
13 ° Le Monde Diplomatique. "La plate-forme de Rome."
139 Le Monde Diplomatique. "La plate-forme de Rome."
140 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. "Negotiating Pacts" Transitionsfrom
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141 Ibid, p 39.
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political views from parties accounting for more than 85 percent ofthe 1991 electoral
votes, it carried a great deal of legitimacy. * 42 Thus its enactment would have frozen out
the extremists on both sides ofthe conflict. The politicians would have successfully
wrested control from the militants. In fact, with political accord, the militants would have
lost the basis for their actions. Society was willing to support actors like the GIA because
the politicians ofthe FIS were unable to achieve any tangible results. Had the
pact been enacted, the disloyal opposition would have had little choice but to acquiesce or
face a united polity hostile to their acts.
Unfortunately however, the signatories ofthe national pact did not control the
conflict. While the deal brought political Islam and civil society closer, the military
resisted what it called, "an unwelcome intrusion into a domestic security concern." If civil
society was to resolve the conflict, it would have to do more than negate the disloyal
opposition; it would have to persuade the government to accept the concept of a national
pact. Since the Platform ofRome called for the acceptance ofthe FIS as a political
movement, and the removal ofthe army from politics, it was unlikely that the regime
would simply acquiesce. Civil society would have to pressure the government to alter its
stance. Thus, the opposition began to carry its united message to the international
community. A drop in European support would send a clear signal to the military that it
would not be able to dictate Algeria's future in light of civil society's efforts.
142 Ibid, p. 38.
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1. International Reaction
For a briefperiod, it appeared that the Platform ofRome would actually have a
chance. The FIS's rapprochement with the secular opposition 'rehabilitated' the
movement internationally. Nations such as the United States that had previously refused
to participate began to hold low level talks with the Islamists. As a result ofthese
openings, even more promising statements came from the FIS. At the urging ofthe
United States, the FIS's parliamentary mission abroad released a statement that openly
condemned all acts ofviolence directed at civilians - a clear attempt to distance the
political FIS from the militant GIA. 143
With regard to Europe however, the movement was unable to persuade the
relevant actors to significantly alter their stance. While distant states such as England and
.
Germany were willing to accept an arrangement brokered by civil society, Algeria was a
peripheral concern and like the United States, they would defer to the foreign policy goals
of their Southern European allies directly affected by the crisis. If international pressure
was to be brought to bear upon the Algerian government, the opposition would have to
commit France to significantly alter its assessment. This never happened. While France
praised the concept of a national pact, it did not significantly alter its economic or political
assistance. In light ofthe unaltered French policy, the remainder ofthe international
community was willing to give the regime a chance to prove itself. Thus, when the army
143 FBIS-NES-95-056. "Opposition Pressures Zeroual on FIS Declaration." Al-Sharq Al-Aswat.
(March 20, 1995)
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announced its own election plan, Europe was quick to announce the restoration of
governmental legitimacy no matter how superior the Platform ofRome.
2. Domestic Reaction
Europe's willingness to support whatever military plan emerged was enhanced by
the poor reception the Platform ofRome received domestically. While the populace
embraced the plan, the radical Islamists ofthe GIA announced through a new series of
bombings that they would not accept marginalization. Ifthe military would not abide by
the rules, then their groups would not be bound by civil society either.
This was unfortunate, because in the immediate aftermath ofthe conference there
were preliminary indications that significant factions ofthe GIA might support the political
ascendancy ofthe FIS. In a communique released a week after the Rome conference the
GIA announced that it was ready to, "stop the war ifthe regime agrees to the opposition
demands reached in Rome."* 44 When however, the military indicated that it had no
intention ofusing the national pact as a framework for negotiations, the radicals quickly
reversed their position, stressing "its objective to establish a caliphate through armed
struggle."145 This was soon followed by the resumption ofthe GIA's aggressive bombing
campaign. The result was a series of car bombs throughout Algiers at a time when
144 JPRS-TOT-95-003-L. "Armed Islamic Group Says Ready to Stop War." Paris AFP. (January
15, 1996)
145 JPRS-TOT-95-003L. "Armed Islamic Groups Reject Rome Accord." Paris Radio France
International. (January 21,1 996)
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international attention was focused upon Algeria, including one toward the end ofJanuary
1995 that killed 42 people and wounded 286. 146
These actions were aimed as much against the FIS as they were against the
government and the general populace. Despite the government's rejection ofthe national
pact, the FIS was willing to stay within the confines ofthe Platform ofRome, applying
political instead of military pressure. In the GIA's view, this decision compromised the
moderate Islamists. Attempting to cooperate with the secular opposition only
demonstrated how far from the path the politicians ofthe FIS had strayed. Soon after the
GIA began to target known FIS supporters in Algeria, and the party's representatives
abroad. The radicals even threatened the family ofAbassi Madani - an action never
proposed by the government. Furthermore, it was following the joining ofthe FIS to the
secular opposition that the GIA began to plan more aggressive acts of resistance such as
the Air France hijacking and the Paris subway bombings.
Ironically, the rejection ofthe pact by extremists on both sides ofthe issue had the
effect ofmaking them unwitting allies. The GIA was able to use the government's
rejection of the national pact as the rationale for its attempt to wrest control ofthe Islamic
movement from the FIS. Meanwhile, the GIA's renewed campaign ofviolence allowed
the military to persuade its European backers than there was no difference between the
political FIS and the radical GIA. Both groups benefited from the other's insurgence at
the expense ofthe secular opposition, the FIS and the common people of Algeria.
146 Algeria OSAC Country Security Report.
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3. The Demise of Civility
The escalation of political violence had the effect of once again marginalizing civil
society. Although Algeria's secular opposition announced that the FIS was trustworthy
and must be included in any political dialogue, civil society was unable to persuade the
international cormnunity to significantly alter its assessment. Despite political Islam's
stated rejection ofviolence as means to attain power, and its commitment to working
within a democratic framework, the GIA's campaign ofterror gave the government the
opportunity to discredit the FIS internationally. Acts such as the murder of foreign
nationals in Algeria and the GIA's Paris subway bombings shed a bad light on Islam in
Algeria no matter what its nature. Thus, when the government proposed a plan in
response to the Platform ofRome, its international sponsors were more than willing to
give it a chance.
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VI. MILITARY EQUILIBRATION
The military has always been a key player in Algerian politics. From the
equilibration ofthe Algerian political system in 1962 to the coup against Benjedid in 1990,
the institution has not hesitated to intervene when its interests have been threatened. Yet,
traditionally, these conflicts have been confined to competition between the army and
other factions within the FLN. This chapter will show the difficulties the army faces in
attempting to deal with societal-based conflict, and why its plan for political equilibration
is likely to fail.
A. MILITARY BEHAVIOR 1991-1995
While the military has always been a dominant actor, it has sought to avoid the
travails and institutional cost of politics. Instead, it has "preferred the shade to the light,
operating behind a veil of civilian leaders and institutions."^4^ When the FLN ruled
Algeria, the army's dual role ofparty faction and military institution served it quite well.
By serving as the swing vote between the political and bureaucratic wings, the military
could exert considerable influence over both, while extracting maximum political
autonomy. The fact that every President since Ben Bella has emerged from the military's
top leadership is far from insignificant. The institutional power ofthe military has
prevented any effective civilian control on military behavior. The Minister ofDefense was
traditionally a serving military officer, and the position moved institutional demands
upward instead of asserting civilian control downward. This autonomy allowed the army
147 Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War", p. 20.
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to generate interests in areas that had little to do with military strategy, but much to do
with personal enrichment. As members ofthe state's elite, officers had their own import
licenses, and could bypass the centralized distribution networks, receiving tidy
commissions on state-issued contracts. * 48
1. Institutional Organization
Maintaining autonomy has traditionally been the military's most important goal.
As such, the military was always careful to arrange an institutional consensus before it
interacted with the other wings ofthe FLN. Since it had to maneuver between the other
two wings ofthe party, the army could not afford to leave any gaps that could be
exploited. Instead of suffering the loss ofprestige that came with the public bickering of
other party factions, the military would hash out its differences in private. As French
political scientist Remy Leveau noted, the army was, "One ofAlgeria's rare, relatively
democratic institutions and it function[ed] by consensus." 14^ However, unlike politicians,
institutional loyalty amongst military officers was more important than political
independence. When the leadership had negotiated a proper course of action, the rank and
file, including those who were not completely satisfied with the result, would support the
policy. The clearest example ofthis was the complete resignation ofthe military's
membership from the FLN in 1990 due to dissatisfaction with President Benjedid's
148 Ibid, p. 20.
l 4^ Remy Leveau, "FIS: The Army Wants to Negotiate", Le Nouvel Observateur no. 3 (February
1994) quoted in Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War," p. 20
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maneuvering. 15° Although these delegates held their positions on the basis ofparty
affiliation, their loyalty to the military as an institution was stronger.
Military maneuvering following the 1991 coup inadvertently damaged this
institutional loyalty. Since the bureaucratic wing was already negated by Benjedid's
reforms, the removal ofthe political wing left the military without an effective opposition
within the party structure. When interim President Mohammed Boudiafwas subsequently
assassinated, the last incentive for military unity died with him The few civilians on the
High State Council (HCE) were firmly under military control. The state would remain
under the army's rule until in the HCE's words, 'The necessary conditions are achieved
for the normal functioning ofthe state. "1 5 1 Since the army unilaterally controlled policy,
the need to establish institutional consensus amongst the rank and file diminished. There
were no coalitions within the FLN threatening the army's autonomy. As a result, while
the military leadership agreed that the Islamists were a threat to Algeria and the
institution's privileged place in society, there was a wide range ofviewpoints on how to
neutralize them
The situation was exacerbated by political maneuvering amongst the military's
leadership. One ofthe coup's key ringleaders, General Khalid Nazir was in poor health
and in danger ofbecoming irrelevant in the military's decision-making process. As a
150 Mortimer, "Algeria: The Clash between Islam, Democracy and the Military", p. 42.
1^1 Azzedine Layachi and Abdel-kader Haireche, "National Development and Political Protest:
Islamists in the Maghreb Countries", Arab Studies Quarterly (Spring/Summer 1992) p. 80.
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result, while he was still dominant, Nazir engineered the appointment of opposing camps
to the state's most influential positions. Retired General Liamine Zeroual was appointed
Minister of Defense, while General Mohammed Lamari was promoted to military Chief of
Staff. 152 As Mortimer noted, "By maintaining a balance between opinions within the top
military leadership he [Nazir] maintained his own role as the ultimate arbitrator." 153
2. Eradicators and Conciliators
The factions that Lamari and Zeroual represented can be broadly grouped as
eradicators and conciliators. The former favored a strategy of brutal suppression as the
only way of dealing with the Islamic threat, while the latter argued that the only way to
save the state from complete collapse was negotiation. In this, the two factions mirror
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter's description ofhard-liners and soft-liners
quite well:
The main core of the hard-liners is formed by those who reject the 'cancers'
and 'disorders' of democracy and believe they have a mission to eliminate all
traces of such pathologies from political life. . This nucleus of unconditional
authoritarians is likely to remain the stubborn source of attempted coups and
conspiracies. . Soft-liners [are created] through their increasing awareness that
the regime . . will have to make use in the foreseeable future some degree or
form of electoral legitimacy.^
152 Ibid, p. 28.
* 53 Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War", p. 29.
154 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. "Opening Authoritarian Regimes." Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule, Prospectsfor Democracy. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and
Laurence Whitehead, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) p. 37.
108
Thus, hard-liners and soft-liners can be two sides of the same coin. Hard-liners feel that
the cost of democratization is higher than the benefits to be received, while soft-liners
focus on the cost of repression. In fact, there is no guarantee that soft-liners are in fact
latent democrats. The differences between the factions might actually be tactical - both
groups sharing the same goal ofpreserving the preeminent status ofthe military while
disagreeing upon the methods through which it is to be achieved.
In Algeria's case, the difference between the factions may result from their origins.
As Hugh Roberts noted, "The main adherents ofthe eradicators have been those officers
who served in the French army. . . . and the French educated wing ofthe political
class."155 Thus, the eradicators are Francophone and elite oriented. Meanwhile, the
conciliators are generally more Arabist. By way of example, General Lamari is a former
French army officer while General Zeroual's military career began with the revolutionaries
oftheFLN. 156
Thus there are clear cultural differences between the two groups. However, while
there were heated disagreements over policy decisions, the military's professionalism and
loyalty ensured the institution's cohesiveness. The military would continue to observe a
single command structure although the divisions at the top hampered policy enactment.
Military behavior toward the Islamists and secular civil society was often inconsistent and
confusing.




When eradicators were dominant, the HCE placed a much greater emphasis
on security concerns than on confidence building. Indeed, at times the treatment given to
civil society was nearly as bad as that displayed toward the Islamists. An excellent
example of eradicator policy would be the HCE's behavior in 1992. Declaring that
"democracy requires a strong and stable state," the government ordered the temporary
cessation of all but state owned newspapers and suppressed the remaining legal political
movements. In seeking to build societal stability, the state drove away society. The
eradicator rationale was that problems requiring military interaction with civil society were
secondary to the Islamic menace. Deciding what role civil organizations would play in
Algeria's future would have to wait until the military conflict was resolved.
Meanwhile, when the conciliators made policy, the government reversed
course and courted civil society through a series ofnational dialogues. However, the
continual vacillation made the secular opposition extremely distrustful ofthe government.
Even ifmilitary conciliators were sincere in their desire to reach an accord with civil
society, the institution's power sharing was such that there was no guarantee that an
agreement would be kept. The prime example of this predicament was the abject failure of
the government's 1994 national conference.
When these talks were held, the conciliators had two major factors working
in their favor. First, as one of its last policy decisions, the inept HCE appointed Liamine
Zeroual as Algeria's interim president. Secondly, Algeria's ongoing financial crisis gave
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the conciliators needed leverage over the eradicators. Key European lenders were
increasing disillusioned with the Algeria's inability to solve the crisis militarily. 157 At the
time, Algeria was negotiating a $ 1 billion loan from the IMF, and attempting to restructure
more than $12 billion in debt via the Paris Club ofgovernment creditors. 158 Providing the
appearance that the government was open to a political settlement proved to be most
useful in securing the financial assistance.
The conciliator's proposal called upon representatives ofthe government,
legal political parties and societal elites to set aside differences and negotiate an end to the
war. Significantly the military promised to send officers that would represent the military
as an institution. In effect, this act was an attempt to drop the facade of civilian rule and
allow the populace directly negotiate with military policy makers. Furthermore, in an
effort designed more to satisfy civil society than its own needs, the government extended a
narrow offer to the FIS. The conference would be open to the participation o£
"Personalities . . . that were respectful of the law . . .and represented not the banned party,
but the current of opinion associated with the FIS."159 In response, the FIS's European
representatives called for the unconditional release ofMadani and Benhadj as a
precondition to any participation.
157 FBIS-NES-95-014 "EU Governments Rethinking Support", The Guardian (January 21, 1995)
p. 11.
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Ill
Zeroual ordered Madani and Benhadj moved from prison to house arrest in
February 1994, and began a series of secret negotiations with them. According to
Mortimer, the government offered to completely release the pair ifthey would, "renounce
the ongoing political violence and declare respect for a secular form ofgovernment with
alteration ofpower." 1^ While the second demand might have been negotiable in the
context ofthe national conference, the first was not open for discussion. Calling for an
end to Islamic violence was putting the cart before the horse; before the jihad ceased, the
military would have to recognize the FIS as a legitimate political movement, and allow it
to unconditionally participate in the national dialogue. To do otherwise would only
diminish the politician's legitimacy in the eyes oftheir followers. Thus, Madani and
Benhadj rejected the government's proposal. As Benhadj responded in a letter to Zeroual:
We support the search for a legitimate and just solution that restores rights
. . . but not in the way advocated by the military junta. . .We refuse to hold
discussions in the dark. . and favor doing so on television screens. We believe
that a solution that does not [address] the roots of the crisis can only
complicate matters. . What you falsely call terrorism is jihad for the sake of
God, and Moslems unsheathe the sword only when all avenues ofpeaceful
legitimate change have been blocked. *"*
The government's inability to compromise with the FIS made the concept
of a national conference pointless. When it finally convened in January 1994, it only
showed how isolated the military had become. As The Economist noted, "All the main
political groups, including the FLN . . . saw the affair as a military face-saver and stayed
160 Ibid.
161 "pjg L^der Challenges Algerian President to Step Down or Accept Arbitration or Televised
Debate", |http://link.laruc.utexas.edu.menic/..se/oilcourse/rnail/algeria/ 0013.html]
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away."162 Mainstream parties such as the FLN and the FFS had no real affinity with the
FIS, but they realized that any settlement achieved without its participation was
meaningless. Stability could not be achieved through the exclusion of a sector as large as
the one from which the Islamists drew their support. When these attempts at dialogue
were rejected, the conciliators were discredited and the eradicators once against gained
the upper hand.
Despite the conference's failure, strong French support allowed the
government to win its IMF loan, and successfully resolve its Paris Club negotiations. With
the economic situation improved, the conciliator's failure to resolve the problem via
negotiations strengthened the hand ofthe eradicators. Within a matter of months, the
government declared that the Islamists were irremediable and returned Benhadj and
Madani to prison. Zeroual then loosened military restrictions, giving Lamari the freedom
to pursue his strategy to the utmost.
b. Military Efforts
The eradicator's military plan called for a two pronged approach. The
army had to reduce the militants' ability to operate in the city, while interdicting then-
supply lines and safe areas in the countryside. Tactical responses were driven by the
evolving nature ofthe Islamic threat. While the armed groups had been limited to
assassinations and drive-by shootings in 1992, by 1994 they were capable of advanced
bombings. According to official figures, in 1994 there were 2725 separate acts of
162
"Time to Turn Back", The Economist, (January 29, 1994) p. 16.
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sabotage and destruction in Algeria at a cost of $2 billion. 16 -* There was little question as
to the effectiveness of the armed groups. The high cost of Islamic violence in the cities
meant the government would need to separate the active combatants from the suppliers.
If Islamic combatants were forced to fall back on their previous tactics, they would be
easier to identify, and cause far less damage. Single gunmen are much easier to deal with
than car bombs with delayed fuses.
Ironically, the army's tactical employment ofthis strategy bears a strong
resemblance to the French military's plan against the FLN. The government would
prevent Islamic movement in the cities though the use of internal checkpoints, personal
papers, and strict enforcement of curfews. Those areas ofmajor cities that were known
strong points of Islamic support were subject to frequent searches and military patrols. In
the countryside, the army and air force conduct frequent patrols ofthe state's main transit
corridors, and strictly control interregional movement. When suspected safe areas are
discovered, the military response is swift and sharp. Although the ground forces are
dominant, Algeria has frequently relied upon helicopters for forward reconnaissance, and
air strikes utilizing napalm amongst other weapons. On occasion, military activity has
meant the violation ofneighboring country's sovereignty. However, these acts apparently
have the tacit approval ofTunisia and Morocco. 164 since there are Islamic opposition
163
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groups active in both countries, any act that lessens the influence ofAlgeria's militants on
their own populace would meet approval.
Within Algeria proper, the military rarely distinguishes between the
militants and the general populace from which they draw their support. Although
international coverage ofthe Algerian crisis is limited, there are a number ofreports that
accuse the government o£ "executing hundreds of civilians who were suspected of
sympathizing with or just being related to rebels . . .and stories related to the castration of
captured rebels and the indiscriminate use ofnapalm."165 As the 1996 Amnesty
International Human Rights Report notes, "In Algeria, hundreds ofpeople were known to
have been extrajudicially executed by the security forces and government-backed militias.
Many were reportedly killed in their homes in front oftheir families, when they posed no
lethal threat."166 From time to time, the military has been little better in its treatment of
the general populace than the armed groups it opposes; a fact readily attested to by
Lamari's admission that, 'To fight the fundamentalists one has to be a bit like them
oneself."167
Eradication policies gave the army a much more visible presence in Algeria,
but provided little overall reduction in the level ofviolence. Its sole area of success was
the temporary suppression ofthe armed group's ability to fight conventional war. When
165 Connelly, p. 33.
166 Amnesty International, "1996 Human Rights Report", [http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/
ireport/ar96sum.html]
167 Connelly, p. 33.
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the GIA and MIA attempted to move mass formations, or conduct large assaults on
outlying towns and garrisons, the rnilitary was able to engage them quite well.
Furthermore, Algeria's close ties to European governments gave them the ability to
eliminate Islamic arms networks. * 68
In reality however, the eradication strategy has been largely ineffective in
dealing with the irregular violence that accounts for most ofthe deaths in Algeria. As
Mortimer notes, "Despite the government's large-scale offensives during the spring of
1995, the insurrection has not been crushed."169 Very few ofthe 50,000 people killed in
the course ofthe war died in battle. Instead, assassinations and bombings provide a slow
but steadily rising toll. This type ofviolence relies upon components that are readily
available from the general populace, or can be pilfered from government stocks. Attempts
to limit access to such material has yielded few results. 170 Furthermore, the eradicator's
harsh treatment ofthe general population prevented it from winning their support.
B. THE 1995 ELECTION: ALGERIA'S FUTURE
Four years of continual conflict gave stark evidence to the reality that the policies
ofboth the eradicators and the conciliators were inadequate for dealing with Algeria's
crisis. With no end to societal violence in sight, the state's military masters had to find a
new basis for their right to rule. Independent ofthe government, Algeria's major political
168 JPRS-TOT-95-003-0, "Czech Arms Allegedly Smuggled to Algerian Fundamentalists." Der
Speigel, (January 23, 1995) p. 15.
169 Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War", p. 39.
170 Algena OSAC Country Security Report.
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parties had created an internationally hailed plan for national reconciliation. The Algerian
government denounced the Rome conference as a "non-event for Algeria. . . ," because it
offered a role to the FIS, and would have forced the military's removal from politics. 171
However, the military's obstinance cost it a great deal of international legitimacy.
Creditors such as the United Kingdom began to publicly state that, "The regime in Algiers
cannot take it for granted that the West's only option is continuation ofthat regime."172
Ifthe Algerian military could not restore a facade of domestic support, its loss of
legitimacy could cost it billions in international loans and foreign investments.
1. The Electoral Process
The loss of international financial support would have had a catastrophic effect on
the military's ability to remain in power. Since it could not accept this loss, or the
limitations on its power found in the Rome conference's plan, the army was forced to
embark on an entirely new course. The unexpected challenge from civil society helped to
reunify the military against the threat of a political opposition. Since the military could not
accept civil society's plan, the only alternative was to outflank it. The national pact had
promised a government ofnational reconciliation and eventual democratization. To win
back international support, the army had to produce a plan that offered the ideas ofthe
national pact without its actual substance. Thus, a mere two months after rejecting civil
171 Algeria OSAC Country Security Report.
172 FBIS-NES-95-014, "EU Governments Rethinking Support", The Guardian, (January 21,
1995)p. 11.
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society's proposal, Zeroual announced the military's plan for political equilibration.
Presidential elections would be held in November 1995, with parliamentary elections
following in 12-18 months. 173 This effectively negated the challenge from civil society.
The validity of a 'democratic' electoral process would restore the regime's international
legitimacy and reassure wary investors.
Despite its brutal treatment ofthe general populace, the military was confident
that it could prevent Algeria from repeating the electoral mistake it made in 1991.
International scrutiny ensured that the election was fairly administered, but the army made
certain that it was not free. Prime Minster Mokdad Sifi admitted as much in March 1995
when he told reporters, "We are preparing the electoral lists . . .as soon as the president
[Zeroual] approves the report we will take it to the transitional assembly. . .we hope to
have a consensus in June."174 Thus, the military determined not only which parties were
allowed to run, but how and when they could campaign. This of course was designed to
prevent the FIS or a successor movement from competing. Further simplifying matters for
the military were the FFS's and FLN's decisions to boycott the election in accordance
with the national pact. 175 Thus, the 1995 election took place in the absence ofpolitical
parties accounting for more than 82 percent ofthe 1991 vote. 176
173 FBIS-NES-95-058, "Zeroual: Local Elections to Follow Presidential Poll", Radio Algiers
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To oppose the societal challengers, Liamine Zeroual ran as the military's
candidate. Interestingly, his formal candidacy was not announced until a mere two months
before the election. This delay is an excellent illustration ofthe narrow balance between
eradicators and conciliators. 177 Zeroual needed to make certain that his candidacy would
be supported by the officer corps before entering the race. Once his candidacy was
approved by the rank and file, his election was guaranteed. In fact his only serious
contender, former Prime Minister Rida Malik, was actually removed from the ballot in mid
October for 'constitutional irregularities.
'
178 Since Malik was a favorite ofthe
eradicators, this act demonstrated to civil society that the military was once again united in
its dealings with outsiders. With Malik removed from the race, Zeroual competed against
representatives ofthree historically minor political parties. He handily won the election on
November 16 1995, with an official tally of 61 percent ofthe vote.^ 79
The realistic electoral returns played well with the international community, which
contrasted the vote with that of Iraq. They noted that while the former offered a single
candidate who received every vote, Algeria's election was "conducted under different
banners. . . .with candidates bearing different agendas."180 The apparently non-fraudulent
returns gave the impression that the people were truly free to choose their own future.
177 Ibid, p. 38.
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Observers from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations declared
that the election had taken place in an atmosphere in which, "calmness, freedom and
transparency prevailed."* 81 As Human Rights Watch Middle East noted the, "100
international election monitors present in Algeria are too limited in number and mandate to
verify the accuracy ofthe results ofthe turnouts. "l 8^ j^q government's pre-election
maneuvering prevented the only real opposition within Algeria from participating. The
San 'Egidio signatories refused to offer candidates because the government program
would not have allowed the FIS to participate.
The elections did offer one surprise. Despite strong pleas from the San 'Egidio
parties and harsh threats from the GIA, the general populace turned out to vote in large
numbers to vote. Government statistics place participation at 75 percent, and in post-
election interviews even FIS representatives admitted that the rate ofparticipation
exceeded 40 percent. The military chose to interpret the large turnout as a strong societal
endorsement of its rule. Thus, the government felt that it had regained both international
and domestic legitimacy. However, though the elections gained a great deal of
international acclaim, ZerouaPs domestic mandate is far from certain.
181 FBIS-NES-95-223, "OAU Observers' Delegation Issues Statement", Algiers Radio Network
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2. Post-Election Behavior
Prior to the election, Zeroual had given the populace the impression that he was
interested in a political solution to the state's authority crisis. Throughout his tenure as
interim President, he met with the FIS's imprisoned leadership on several different
occasions in an attempt to iron out differences. Following the election however,
Zeroual' s behavior indicates that the government no longer supports this policy. His
remarks in a May 1996 press conference serve as a good indicator ofthe conciliator's new
approach:
The consequences of the crisis . . is confusion between political practices
and the exploitation not just of Islam but of all out values, and the basic
elements of our character ... Ifwe want to bring our country out of this
crisis ... we must protect the basic elements of the national character from
political manipulation because Islam is the religion of all Algerians ... If
anyone wants to go into politics, let them present a political program, economic
program, and social program . . . but its basic element should not be religious,
as no group has a monopoly. I 83
Thus, the election's high voter turnout and strongly displayed international support have
given the government the beliefthat it can consolidate its power and co-opt civil society
while continuing to suppress the political Islam offered by the FIS.
The danger with such a plan is that the populace may not have participated as a
show of support for the military's rule. Instead, they might have actually taken Zeroual'
s
pre-election behavior at face value and voted in an attempt to empower a government
capable ofnegotiating a political solution. Indeed, the government should have been
183 FBIS-NES-96-089, "Algeria: Zeroual Answers Questions at News Conference." Radio
Algiers (May 5, 1996)
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worried by the official results ofthe presidential election. Zeroual handily won, but
Mahfoud Nahanh ofthe HAMAS party (no connection to the Palestinian group ofthe
same name) placed second with 26 percent ofthe vote. 18^ This strong show of Islamic
support purportedly showed the international community how fair the election was.
However, it also demonstrates the weakness ofthe government's hold over the Algerian
people.
Like the FIS, HAMAS was an Islamic-based political movement that emerged
during Benjedid's initial liberalization. It ran on a platform of revivalist Islam, which
meant, "The rejection of state-sponsored Islam in favor ofpolitical change through
acculturation, socialization, and education."185 Thus, the party sought to raise religious
awareness in Algeria without an overt political agenda like the FIS. This kept it from
being a threat to the establishment, but also prevented it from developing a broad base of
support. In the 1991 parliamentary elections, it garnered a mere two percent ofthe vote.
Little had changed in the interim four and a half years. HAMAS still calls for the
Islamization of society without any definite political agenda. Furthermore, while it has
called for meaningful dialogue amongst all political movement, it has maintained fealty to
the military government. Its behavior has led John Entelis to wonder ifHAMAS is,
"manipulated by the state in an effort to divide and conquer political Islam"186 With little
184 Roberts, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algeria War" p. 38.
185 John Entelis, "Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Nonviolent Dimension." in United States
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186 Ibid, p 95.
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change to the party's nature, what can account for its tenfold increase in electoral
support? The answer is quite simple - HAMAS was the only Islamic party allowed to
participate in the election. Since HAMAS had previously called for the re-legalization of
the FIS, and a national reconciliation based on the San 'Egidio pact, it was able to draw
from those sectors ofAlgerian society favorable to Islamization and national
reconciliation.
Zeroual attempted to consolidate the military's victory by proposing a coalition
government with his defeated electoral opponents. All three parties soon accepted. * 87
This action was a harbinger ofthe current attempt to co-opt civil society. By bringing
opposition parties supportive ofthe military into the government, Zeroual could increase
the pressure on the secular political parties that had boycotted the election. Tame
opposition parties like HAMAS have absolutely no power and minimal influence on
government policy. However, access to the government means access to government run
patrimonial networks. Thus, the power ofthese parties relative to the government has not
changed, but their power relative to the political parties that boycotted the elections has
increased dramatically.
By forming this coalition government, the military has succeeded in creating a
wedge issue that could split the San Egidio signatories. With its international legitimacy
restored via the elections, the minimal leverage that civil society possessed to pressure the
187 FBIS-NES-95-250, "Opposition Parties Accept Cabinet Role", Paris Radio France
International (December 28, 1995)
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government has dissipated. Future discourse would be in accordance with the
government's plan instead ofthe San 'Egidio pact. If secular parties want to participate in
future elections, they will have to eschew the national pact and break the political alliance
with the FIS. ^°° In March 1996, the FLN became the first major party to renege on the
San 'Egidio pact. Claiming that, "the presidential election . . .has enhanced the legitimacy
ofthe highest institution in the country," the party welcomed the opportunity to
participate whenever the government convenes its national conference. ^ 89 As ofApril
1996, the FFS and Ennahda had agreed to preliminary consultations toward a revision of
the constitution prior to parliamentary elections. 19^
3. International Reaction
In general the international community has been satisfied with the government's
plan. The United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, Robert
Pelletreau, summed the international community's stance quite well when he testified that
he was, "encouraged by President Zeroual's commitment to strengthen democratic
pluralism in Algeria ... a program ofpolitical inclusion, more aggressive economic
reform, proactive security measures and continued marginalization of extremists provides
188 FBIS-NES-96-051, "Algeria: Consultations to Begin on Date for Legislative Elections."
Radio France International (13 March 1 996)
189 FBIS-NES-96-043, "Algeria: FLN Committee Statement Condemns Violence, Hails
Elections", Radio Algiers Network (March 2, 1996)
190 FBIS-NES-96-075, "Algeria: President Receives Leaders of FFS, Ennahda Movement",
Radio Algiers Network (April 16, 1996)
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a basis for stability, "l^l Since the election gave Zeroual some domestic legitimacy, the
international community felt it no longer needed to support the risky venture proposed by
civil society. IfZeroual could consolidate his power and force the secular opposition to
submit or face marginalization, then relations between Algeria and the international
community could return to normal.
C. PROBABILITY OF EQUILIBRATION
The problem however stems from the fact that the election was not the first step in
a political transformation. Instead it was the restoration oflegitimacy to the military-led
regime. To properly evaluate its long-term success, the military's plan must be subjected
to two distinct questions; 1) Will the government's plan lead to the democratization that
the international community claims to support and 2) Will the regime's actions lead to
increased stability? At this juncture, political equilibration in Algeria is far from certain.
1. Democratization
As Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter note, the difference between hard-
liners and soft-liners can be one oftactics instead of ideology. 192 Hard-liners focus on the
cost of democratization and soft-liners focus on the price of repression, but both are
motivated by the desire to preserve the military's institutional interests. In Algeria's case,
the split between Eradicators and Conciliators developed largely from the fear that the
19 * Robert Pellatreau. "Congressional Testimony on Recent Events in the Middle East and North
Africa, June 16, 1996. [http://www.uic.dos.fan/ rest of address!]
192 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. "Opening Authoritarian Regimes." Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule, Prospectsfor Democracy. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and
Laurence Whitehead, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) p. 37.
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international community would fail to support military rule. Thus, the restoration of
international legitimacy following Zeroual's election has helped to resolve their
differences. With no external political threats, the military is free to seek equilibration in
whatever manner it pleases.
Since the military is in control of Algeria, there is little question that it will attempt
to install a political future that serves its own institutional interests. However, such
motivations are not always self-serving. In cases such as the 1989 redemocratization of
Chile, the military sought to install civilian leaders, "in order to protect its own
fundamental corporate interests."193 In seeking to avoid the high cost to its integrity
posed by continual rule, the military will work toward the same goal as civil society; its
extraction from the political process. This is clearly the outcome desired by the West.
Unfortunately, it is also the one that is least likely to come to fruition.
This outcome results only when the military's corporate interests differ from the
top leadership's political goals. In Algeria however, the army's traditional preeminence
amongst the state's political elites has blurred the line between the two sets of interests.
In their minds fulfilling the military's political goals satisfies the corporate goals. As
Alfred Stephan writes, 'If it is not perceived to be in the interests ofthe military-as-
corporate-institution to extricate itselffrom power . . . [equilibration] may fail because of
193 Alfred Stephan. "Paths toward Redemocratization." Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule,
Prospectsfor Democracy. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, ed
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) p. 74.
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. . . military resistance and no actual transfer ofpower may occur."194 In such a situation,
the military is more likely to capture the political system than to disengage from it. The
army will use the electoral process to establish and legitimize its hegemonic rule instead of
equilibrating democracy. Instead of returning control ofpolitics to society, it will seek to
keep society under its control.
Despite its stated goal of a pluralistic political system, the military's behavior vis-a-
vis civil society shows that it is not interested in democratization. Its desired system
would have a thin veneer ofpopular participation to provide cover to the continuation of
the military-controlled government. To this end, while the government has held
negotiations with various opposition groups, its goal has not been the formation of any
real form of coalition government. Instead of sharing power, the government has
organized talks only to split and weaken the civil opposition united by the San 'Egidio
pact. It wants to use its newfound international legitimacy, and renewed access to foreign
capital to force the major secular opposition groups into subordinate positions while using
its military muscle to obliterate the moderate political Islam ofthe FIS. It is an attempt to
recreate the iron triangle ofthe FLN with a multi-party political wing. If secular political
parties accept military control, they could gain access to the state distribution networks
enjoyed by the political and bureaucratic wings ofthe FLN prior to the crisis of 1989. In
return they would cease to function as a real political opposition.
194 Ibid, p. 76.
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Despite the commitment to discuss future elections, it is unlikely that long-
suffering opposition parties would commit to such an arrangement. Secular opposition
groups such as the FFS were arranged around specific goals, such as recognition ofthe
cultural rights ofAlgeria's Berber minority. The only way to co-opt these groups will be
for the government to acquiesce to their social demands. However, the government does
not have to co-opt the entirety ofthe political opposition. Merely weakening it to the
point where it cannot challenge the state politically would be sufficient. With signatories
such as the revamped FLN willing to sell out their partners for a piece ofthe action, the
government has a real chance of destroying the San 'Egidio pact.
2. Stability
In reality, the end ofthe San 'Egidio pact will pose new dangers for Algeria. The
pact offered a role for political Islam that is not to be found in the government's plan.
Attempting to equilibrate the system without a role for Islamic movements will introduce
the probability of a high level of instability. The government believed that proper co-
optation of civil society will negate the need to negotiate with the Islamists, despite the
FIS's initial recognition of Zeroual's electoral legitimacy. The government's control over
the secular opposition will allow the military to treat political Islam the same way as
militant Islam. It can use the tame opposition ofHAMAS to present a facade of Islamic
participation while completely suppressing the FIS.
In this, the government presupposes that the only available option for FIS
supporters is a reluctant acceptance ofthe military's plan for political equilibration.
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However, the government's control over Islamic sympathizers is far from complete. In
fact, should the FIS become isolated politically, the odds are that its moderating influence
over the Islamic opposition would decrease significantly. The emergence ofthe GIA has
already marginalized the FIS's control over its military wing. With no hope of
participating in the system, the FIS could lose significant levels of support. However,
instead of transferring their loyalty to the government, these supporters are more likely to
switch their allegiance to the Islamic militants.
Ifthis were merely a small sector ofAlgerian society, then the risk would be
negligible. The government would have to deal with a temporary increase in the number
of terrorist incidents, but the military's increased vulnerability would soon lead to their
demise. In Algeria however, political Islam still commands a strong level of support.
Isolating the moderates ofthe FIS would significantly weaken the party, but there is no
guarantee that the rank and file would then accept the military's plan. Indeed, by
weakening those who advocate change within the system, the government aids those who
seek its destruction. As Juan Linz notes, "The reequilibration model is only possible when
the semi-loyal opposition is capable of controlling and neutralizing a disloyal
opposition."195 Weakening the FIS only strengthens the GIA. By concentrating
attempting to co-opt the secular political opposition while ignoring the FIS, the
government has introduced a dangerous amount of instability to the system
195 Linz, p. 88.
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Furthermore, while it is attempting to establish political dominance over the
secular opposition, the military's hold on the general populace is less than firm. Algeria
faces huge socio-economic problems; a young steadily increasing population, high
unemployment, a severe housing shortage, and a high concentration of wealth in the
government. These are the root issues that led to the public's disenchantment with the
FLN in the late 1980's, yet the government is doing little to address them.
As a result, there is already evidence to show that while the political class is willing
to negotiate, the general populace is as apprehensive ofthe government's plan as it is of
an Islamic Algeria. To secure its massive world bank loans, the government promised to
rid itself ofthe large inefficient parastatals that dominate the Algerian economy.
However, these companies are ripe plums for the distribution ofpetty favors, and the
introduction of sweetheart deals between government officials and foreign businessmen.
Thus, once again the government is playing its interests off against those ofthe small but
extremely important private sector. ^6 Uneven taxation, and government subsidization of
state owned corporations will only alienate those sectors ofthe economy where private
wealth exists. In 1991, similar policies led the merchants to shift their support to the FIS.
In a future Algeria without a channel for dissent, the probability that this support will go
towards armed resistance will increase markedly.
196 FBIS-NES-96-080. "Algeria: Employers Alarmed at Delays in Liberalization of Economy."
Liberie. (April 13, 1996) p. 2.
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D. EUROPEAN CONCERNS
Europe should be extremely concerned by the military government's actions. As
demonstrated by the 5 August 1996 assassination ofthe French-born Archbishop of Oran,
the government's plan has not weakened support for the GIA. 197 Claiming to support the
San 'Egidio pact and then switching to back the government's proposal may satisfy
Europe's short-term economic interests, but it dramatically increases the stakes for its
security considerations. The political and economic cover provided to Zeroual's
government creates the perception that European nations are co-belligerents. Islamists
have a long memory and Europe will be held equally accountable for the FIS's failure to
achieve power through peaceful means. Further bombings in Europe, and increased
targeting ofEuropean nationals in North Africa are likely. The only question is whether
.
America's non-committal but pro-government stance will also produce targeting of
American interests.
I 97 Gail Chaddock. "Mixed Message from Paris to Algiers: Iron Barricades and $1 Billion in
Aid " Christian Science Monitor (August 5, 1996) p. A 2.
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VH. PREDICTIVE CONCLUSIONS
The Algerian conflict remains unresolved. Although the presidential elections have
allowed the military to regain the support ofthe international community, there is little
evidence that its plan will be able to capture the general populace. The plan serves the
interests ofthe military and bureaucratic elites instead the general populace. As such it is
less of a political transformation than a reinstatement ofthe previous political system and
its accompanying instability. Should the military succeed, it is likely that the conflict will
continue unabated.
A. THE RETURN OF THE IRON TRIANGLE
The military plan attempts to suppress and co-opt civil society while destroying the
moderates ofthe FIS. The clearest evidence of this is the army's post-election behavior
vis-a-vis civil society. Whenever possible, it has attempted to separate the two spheres of
political opposition. Secular parties can either accept a subordinate role in the future
political system or face being legislated out of existence. Meanwhile, political Islam
continues to be brutally suppressed. Despite the FIS's post-San 'Egidio pledge to end
political violence and respect the rights of other political movements, the government has
steadfastly refused to include the party in its negotiations. Indeed, President Zeroual and
his top military advisors have openly called for a rewrite ofthe 1989 constitution prior to
the national parliamentary elections tentatively scheduled for Fall 1997, an act clearly
designed to prevent a FIS challenge. 198
198 FBIS-NES-96-081. "Algeria: Review of Constitution May Be on Agenda of Consultations
'
El Watan. (April 11, 1996) p. 3.
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In place of democracy, the army's dominance is likely to lead to the reemergence
ofthe iron triangle. The troika ofparty-bureaucracy-military would once again rule
Algeria, balancing the demands ofthe state's political elites against the needs ofthe
general populace. The only difference being the alteration ofthe patronage networks to
include the co-opted leaders ofthe secular political leaders in the triangle's political wing.
The military would still maintain control over the workings ofthe government, and remain
the true source ofpower in Algeria. The inclusion of opposition movements would
provide the facade ofdemocracy while in reality no power would actually change hands.
The result will be political equilibration with the same systemic flaws that doomed the
previous regime in 1989.
Such an arrangement might be able to capture the state's political elites, but it is .
unlikely to placate the general populace. Co-opting the political elites will bring temporary
stability, but it does little to address the basic issues that led society to rebel against the
system in the first place. Thirty years of incompetent socialism and five years of civil war
or strife have left their mark on the populace. While the common people want peace and
stability, they also desire equality and justice. In light ofpast governmental truculence,
such behavior would play into the hands ofthe radical Islamists. The attempt to socially
ignore and politically suppress the Islamists is very dangerous; the unincorporated sector
ofthe population will be too large to suppress, and the government will have limited
resources to control it. With the secular opposition discredited, and political Islam
suppressed, the only readily available outlet for dissent will be armed resistance.
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Despite this, the government will probably be able to enact its flawed equilibration
because ofthe strong support it receives from the international community. The symbiotic
dependence between Europe and Algeria allows the former to exercise a great deal of
influence on the latter. The historical economic ties between Europe and the Algerian
government, as well as Western fear ofpolitical Islam, have led to strong economic and
political support for the military regime during the transition period. Acts such as the
United State's Export-Import Bank's August 1996 decision to restore short and medium
cover to Algerian investments, show the political opposition that the international
community is unwilling to support their positions. 1" This helps to marginalize the
politically-based opposition. With the international community supporting the
government, opposition leaders will be forced to acquiesce to whatever proposals the
government offers, or witness the loss of their supporters and materiel as their followers
abandon their cause in favor ofmore radical solutions.
Indeed, the ironic part ofthe government's plan is that it will produce more
support for radical jihad than the GIA could have ever mustered on its own. Co-opting
the secular political opposition and suppressing the moderate Islam ofthe FIS will leave
armed resistance as the only available method of obtaining power. When this occurs, the
GIA will be the group with the training, organizational capacity, and ideology to
199
"Eximbank Restores Medium-Term Cover." Middle East Economic Digest (August 23,
1996) p. 18.
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spearhead the movement. Unless Western support is transferred from the regime to
society, the next Algerian political crisis will result in the empowerment of radical Islam
B. EUROPEAN CONCERNS
The West has been supportive ofthe military's plan for equilibration because of its
fear of Islam in Algeria. Western behavior indicates that the international community felt
that any act that weakened the regime would only aid radical groups like the GIA. Thus,
while the San 'Egidio conference received strong international praise, civil society
received little in the way of tangible support. Whenever necessary, the West has
interceded politically and economically to assist the military. This support is intended to
strengthen the military vis-a-vis military Islamists, but it also has the effect ofweakening
civil society. In effect, it can marginalize the moderate opposition as the line between
government loyalists and radical militants solidifies. In the case ofAlgeria, Western
behavior will give the government a much better chance ofbending civil society to its will,
but a much lower chance ofmaintaining its support.
Since European support is a key factor in deterrnining the outcome, the question
must be asked as to whether or not its interests are truly served in the military plan.
Europe has endeavored to help the military government because of its reliance upon
Algerian natural gas for its energy needs, and the fear ofwhat would result from a radical
Islamic government on its periphery. However, while the military plan will definitely assist
European states with their short-term economic goals, it places their long-term political
goals in doubt. The marginalization ofthe FIS, and the co-optation of secular opposition
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parties will only strengthen the positions of radical Islamic groups such as the GIA. When
society's expectations are unfulfilled, the politicians will have been compromised by their
compliance, and the radicals will have a much greater legitimacy. As a result, when
Algeria implodes again, the result will be the collapsed state that Europe feared would
emerge ifthe FIS had been allowed to take power in 1991. By acquiescing to the
military's plan to protect its short term interests, Western government put their long-term
interests in grave jeopardy.
C. A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
However, Algeria does not have to be a problem with a binary solution. Although
the political process is threatened by both the military and the radical Islamists, there is a
centrist alternative that could function if it received enough support. Instead of attempting
to preserve the status quo in Algeria, the international community should undertake a
pragmatic policy that would minimize the cost ofregime transition. With this in mind, the
best alternative would be the formation of a national pact that gave all political factions,
including those Islamists willing to forego violence, the ability to participate within the
system
Opening the system to whatever parties wish to participate will have two distinct
effects. First, it will serve to marginalize the radicals that reject the democratic process
entirely. Strengthening the capacities ofthe moderates in the FIS who are willing to work
through the political system will help to lower the capacities of radicals such as the GIA
that seek to destroy it. When opposition groups acquire a stake in the political system,
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their followers will gain the opportunity to present their grievances and freely participate
in the political process. This gives the system legitimacy, lowering the desire to seek
radical changes to its nature. Secondly, such a system will force leaders to accept political
compromise with other parties to successfully advance their agenda. By placing political
Islam within the constraints of a democratic system, its leaders would be forced to respect
the rights of secular political parties, and accept political compromises to secure the votes
necessary to advance their agenda. The key is to frame political Islam as simply one facet
of equilibration. Support should be provided through the context of empowering civil
society and the political opposition including the Islamists, instead of directly endorsing
the FIS.
Luckily the groundwork for such a path has already been established; the Platform
ofRome that resulted from the San 'Egidio conference is the medium through which the
international community should work to resolve Algeria's failing equilibration. The San
'Egidio conference secured promises from opposition groups ranging from the pro-Berber
FFS to the Islamic FIS to respect basic rights such as democratic elections, an end to
political violence, and respect for basic human rights. Furthermore, its signatories
represented more than 85% ofthe 1991 parliamentary elections. However, its acceptance
of a role for political Islam, and its call for an end to the military's role in Algerian politics
has thus far made it unacceptable. The military refused to consider the proposal because
of its own institutional interests while the international community offered only lukewarm
support for fear of an Islamic government coming to power.
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As a result ofminimal international commitment, the government has been able to
undertake a policy designed to divide and conquer the San 'Egidio signatories. It is
attempting to assimilate the parties that agree with its policies, repress those that refuse,
while seeking the military destruction of political Islam. This plan exists because of
Europe's tolerance. As demonstrated by the 1995 Presidential elections, when
international support is conditioned upon government behavior, the regime has been
willing to undertake minimal political reform. In light ofthe government's truculence, it is
time for the international community to once again force the military regime onto a path
toward democratization. This would be best accomplished by switching support toward
the political opposition and the Platform ofRome. While the end to the special
relationship between Europe and Algeria will probably mean higher export costs for
Algerian gas and oil, the stability it would produce will ensure its continued flow. The
post-San 'Egidio FIS promised to work within the democratic process, and respect the
rights of other political parties. Properly constrained by an active political opposition, and
a strong civil society, an Algeria that numbers the FIS amongst its political elites would be
a far better alternative than the ascension ofuncompromising revolutionaries like the GIA.
D. AMERICAN POLICY OPTIONS
Since the key to resolving the Algerian conflict is the transfer of international support
from the government to civil society, the United States should evaluate its ties to the
current regime. Policies such as the aforementioned restoration ofmedium term export
cover, or Undersecretary of State Robert Pellatreau's May 1996 visit to Algeria
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strengthen the government at the expense ofthe loyal political opposition, not the radicals
ofthe GIA. Since the carrot has proven inadequate, the United States must be prepared
to use to the stick to force Algeria to deal fairly with the political opposition, including the
FIS. Continued financial and political support must be contingent upon government
respect for human rights, free elections, and open political participation.
Algeria requires a realistic approach. While the United States may be loathe to
directly endorse the political Islam ofthe FIS, it cannot be party to its destruction either.
The United States should move beyond mere words to convince its European allies that
democratization in Algeria is not akin to Shia revolution in Iran, and that within the
confines of a strong civil society, the FIS's leaders will be a moderating influence in
resolving the conflict. As this thesis has demonstrated, the political Islam offered by the
FIS is not a direct threat to the United States or its European. In fact, the possibility of
systemic failure in Algeria exists because ofthe international community's tolerance for
artificial restrictions on political determination. With the excesses ofpolitical Islam
constrained by a strong civil society, Islamic leaders will be forced to build coalitions, and
seek compromises in order to advance their most pressing pieces of legislation. The key is
to frame political Islam as simply one facet of equilibration. Support should be provided
through the context of empowering civil society and the political opposition, including the
FIS.
Political equilibration in Algeria will emerge only ifthe United States and its
European allies are willing to pressure ZerouaPs government to compromise instead of
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conquer. While the result ofthis will be the empowerment of an Algerian government less
willing to accede to European economic interests, its legitimacy would produce long-term
stability, ending European fears of a mass exodus of Algerians northward, and paving the
way for a long overdue detente. Should the international community fail to realize the
need to force the government to deal with the political opposition, the opportunity
presented by the Platform ofRome will be remembered as a lost opportunity as Algeria
disintegrates under the strain of continual civil war.
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